Florida Law Review
Volume 39

Issue 2

Article 1

March 1987

Procedural Due Process in Canadian Constitutional Law: Natural
Justice and Fundamental Justicd
Roderick A. Macdonald

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Roderick A. Macdonald, Procedural Due Process in Canadian Constitutional Law: Natural Justice and
Fundamental Justicd, 39 Fla. L. Rev. 217 (1987).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss2/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Macdonald: Procedural Due Process in Canadian Constitutional Law: Natural Ju

University of Florida Law Review
NUMBER 2

SPRING 1987

VOLUME 39

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN
CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
NATURAL JUSTICE AND FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE
Roderick A. Macdonald*
I.

II.

III.

INTRODUCTION

A. Political Theory ..........................
B. Constitutional Traditions ...................

220
221
225

C. Legal Ideology ............................

228

CANADIAN POLITICAL AND LEGAL CULTURE

.....

NATURAL JUSTICE AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AT
COMMON

IV.

218

...........................

LAW .........

....................

230

A. JudicialStrategies to Sustain Due Process Values.
B. The Development of Natural Justice ..........
C. The Emergence of ProceduralFairness .......

231
235
238

D. Other Common Law Due Process Vehicles .....

240

FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS ....................

242

*Dean, Faculty of Law, McGill University. This is an abbreviated version of a paper read
at the Conference on Procedural Due Process: Liberty and Justice, Gainesville, Florida, on
February 13, 1987. Many people have helped me sharpen the argument of this article. In
particular I should like to thank Professor David Mullan of the Faculty of Law of Queen's
University, Kingston, and Professor Brayton Polka of the Department of History of York
University, Toronto, as well as my own colleagues Professors Daniel Jutras and Stephen Toope,
each of whom reviewed the entire manuscript. I am also indebted to the participants at a
Faculty of Law Workshop at the University of Southern California, to whom an early version
of sections two and five was read in October, 1986. Finally, I benefitted from the insights of
Professors Jennifer Sharpe and Jerome Bickenbach, who publicly commented on the paper as
delivered and privately offered several suggestions for its improvement. Research for this essay
was supported in part by a grant from the Meredith Research Fund of the Faculty of Law,
McGill University.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 1

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

218

A.

Rediscovering Non-ProceduralDue Process .....

244

B.

Finding Property in Life, Liberty, and Security
of the Person............................

247

The Scope and ProceduralContent of
FundamentalJustice .......................

250

C.
V.

VI.

[Vol. 39

THE INTERACTION OF THE NATURAL JUSTICE
AND THE FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ....

254

A.

Standing, Judicial Jurisdiction, and Remedies ..

255

B.

Constitutional Status and Judicial Deference ...

257

C.

The Political Theory Underlying Fundamental
Justice .................................

261

CONCLUSION .......

.............................
I.

264

INTRODUCTION

The adoption in 1982 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, (the "Charter") was a singular legal event. For the first time,

a constitutional democracy in the common law tradition enacted a
written due process guarantee without at the same time undergoing
a political revolution. In this article my objective is to describe and

assess that event in a manner that is meaningful to an American
audience. 2 In doing so I also hope to suggest how the Canadian pro-

1. Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, §§ 1-34, Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, sched. B (U.K.).
2. The doctrinal literature on the CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS in
general is voluminous. The narrow theme of this paper alone (the relationship between the
common law natural justice standard and the fundamental justice standard elaborated in section
7 of the Charter) involves dozens of sources. The more helpful are HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw OF CANADA 34 (2d ed. 1985); Bender, Commentary, 13 MAN. L.J. 489 (1983); Christian,
Section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Constraints on State Action, 22 ALTA. L.
REV. 222 (1984); Cumming, FundamentalJustice in the Charter, 11 QUEEN'S L.J. 134 (1986);
Dupl6, L'article 7 de la Charte Canadienne des droits et liberts et les principes de justice
fondamentale, 25 LES CAHIERS DE DROIT [C. DE D.] 99 (1984); Garant, FundamentalFreedoms
and Natural Justice, in

CANADIAN

CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS: COMMENTARY

257 (W. Tarnopolsky & G. Beaudoin eds. 1982) [hereinafter Freedoms]; Garant, L'article 7 de
la Charte - toujours 6nigmatique apr s 18 mois de jurisprudence, 13 MAN. L.J. 477 (1983);
Mackay, FairnessAfter the Charter, 10 QUEEN'S L.J. 263 (1985); Mullan, Judicial Deference
to Administrative Decision-Making in the Age of the Charter, 50 SASK. L. REV. 203 (1985-86)
[hereinafter Judicial Deference]; Mullan, Unfairness in Administrative Processes: The Impact
of Nicholson and the Charter, in PITBLADO LECTURES 78 (1983); Tremblay, Section 7 of the
Charter:Substantive Due Process, 18 U.B.C.L. REV. 201 (1984); Whyte, Fundamental Justice:
The Scope and Application of Section 7 of the Charter, 13 MAN. L.J. 455 (1983).
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cedural due process experience can contribute to a deeper understanding of both the concept of due process and the theory of judicial review
of legislation in contemporary liberal democracies.
This article is divided into four sections. The first section reviews
salient features of the Canadian constitutional tradition, for I believe
that differences between Canadian and American political cultures
account in large measure for differences in their respective legal cultures. The second section examines the origins and growth of "natural
justice" as an Anglo-Canadian common law standard of procedural due
process. The third section explores the meaning of the "fundamental
justice" standard set out in section 7 of the Charter. The fourth section
considers the interaction of the natural justice and fundamental justice
standards in order to evaluate, first, whether the Charter can be
understood simply as an analogue of the first ten amendments to the
United States Constitution; and, second, whether it has actually modified Canadian conceptions of procedural due process. The conclusion
sketches the rudiments of a unique model of constitutional procedural
due process review that is emergent in Canada today.
In any article such as this there is a considerable risk of misunderstanding. Cross-cultural translation is a particular concern. In law,
not only specific terms, but also more general concepts and even entire
epistemological units are system contingent. 3 Moreover, because this
article is both descriptive and normative many nuances in the argument must be left either unstated or underdeveloped. Finally, because
due process is often a surrogate deployed for lack of adequate legal
architecture elsewhere, it is obvious that many Canadian uses (and
non-uses) of due process norms are comprehensible only against the
background of institutions, practices, and understandings peculiar to
Canada. Nevertheless, I trust that the story I am about to relate may
serve in some small way to illumine the tacit presumptions of contemporary American procedural due process theory.

I have counted, in addition, some eighteen other monograph or periodical sources dealing in
some detail with one or another aspect of § 7. In my view the best overall treatment of the
history, scope and interpretation of the Charter is that by D. GIBSON, THE LAW OF THE
CHARTER: GENERAL PRINCIPLES (1986).

3.

I am especially sensitive to the methodological issues of legal transplantation and compara-

tive law raised in the recent debates between the late Otto Kahn-Freund and Alan Watson. For
the last round, see Kahn-Freund, Comman Law and Civil Law - Imaginaryand Real Obstacles
to Assimilation in NEW PERSPECTIVES FOR A COMMON LAW OF EUROPE 63 (M. Cappelletti
ed. 1978) and A. WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL LAW chs. 3, 5 & 12 (1981). Of course,
the coexistence of both civil law and common law traditions in Canada keeps the perils of
comparative law constantly in view.
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CANADIAN POLITICAL AND LEGAL CULTURE

Social historians and legal theorists are fond of noting that Canadian
political culture is not cast in the classical liberal-democratic mould.
As a result, it has not generated a national legal order that meets or even aspires to - the minimum requirements of legal liberalism
as defined in documents such as the United States Constitution.
Rather, Canadian political culture comprises elements derived from
divergent intellectual traditions, and Canadian legal culture has been
British rather than American in overall orientation. Therefore, to set
the stage properly for an assessment of various standards of procedural
due process in Canada, it
is helpful to recall salient features of this
4
political and legal order.

4. I put aside, as beyond the scope of this article, those features of the Canadian political
and legal order that result from the juxtaposition of French and English traditions in a federal
state. For a brief theoretical exploration, see P. TRUDEAU, FEDERALISM AND THE FRENCH
CANADIANS (1968), a book that remains the locus classicus.

Many of the issues canvassed in the following paragraphs were first given a coherent theoretical exposition in G. HOROWITZ, CANADIAN LABOUR IN POLITICS ch. 1 (1968); see generally
G. GRANT, ENGLISH SPEAKING JUSTICE (1974); G. GRANT, TECHNOLOGY AND EMPIRE
(1969); Macdonald, UnderstandingRegulation by Regulations,in REGULATIONS, CROWN CORPORATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS 111 (I. Bernier & A. Lajoie eds. 1985); Monahan, At Doctrine's Twilight: The Structure of CanadianFederalism, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 47

(1985).
Horowitz's explicit appropriation of Louis Hartz's fragment theory as an explanation of
differences between United States and Canadian political culture has not gone unchallenged.
See, e.g., Armstrong & Nelles, ContrastingDevelopment of the Hydro-Electric Industry in the
Montreal and Toronto Regions 1900-1930, 18 J. CAN. STUD. 5 (1983); Dewar, The Origins of
PublicBroadcastingin Canadain ComparativePerspective, 8 CAN. J. Comm. 26 (1982); Dewar,
Private Utilities and Municipal Ownership in Ontario 1891-1900, 12 URB. HIST. REV. 29
(1983); Dewar, Toryism and Public Ownership in Canada:A Comment, 63 CAN. HIST. REV.
404 (1983); Kettler, The Question of Legal Conservatism in Canada: A Review of Essays in
the History of Canadian Law, 18 J. CAN. STUD. 136 (1983); Nelles, Public Ownership of
Electrical Utilities in Manitoba and Ontario 1906-1930, 57 CAN. HIST. REV. 461 (1976).
Nevertheless, recent work in Canadian legal and social history confirms, regardless of the

explanation, the essential features of Horowitz's description of Canadian political culture. See
Baker, Legal Educationin Upper Canada1785-1889: The Law Society as Educator,in 2 ESSAYS
IN THE HISTORY OF CANADIAN LAW ch. 2 (D. Flaherty ed. 1983); Baker, The Reconstitution
of Upper CanadianLegal Thought in the Late-Victorian Empire, in 3 LAW AND HIST. REV.
219 (1985); Gidney & Lawr, Bureaucracy vs. Community?: The Origins of BureaucraticProcedure in the Upper CanadianSchool System, in J. Soc. HIST. 438 (1980); Vipond, Constitutional
Politics and the Legacy of the ProvincialRights Movement in Canada, 18 CAN. J. ECON. &
POL. Sci. 267 (1985).
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A.

Political Ideology

A first noteworthy characteristic of Canadian political culture is
the diversity of ideological tendencies that are accepted as legitimate.
By contrast with the situation prevailing in the United States, strong
non-liberal and non-egalitarian threads remain woven into Canada's
political fabric.6 Over the past two hundred years, toryism, whiggism,
liberalism, and socialism have been Canada's most influential political
6
traditions.
In their archetypal form, Canada's four political traditons may be
differentiated on two intersecting axes. On an axis reflecting conceptions of state and individual they may be divided into non-democratic
ideologies - toryism and whiggism, and democratic ideologies liberalism and socialism. In this usage, the expression "democratic"
entails a commitment to the political equality of citizens as citizens.
Persons espousing the democratic ideal believe that basic political
rights can be neither expanded nor abridged for reasons of wealth,
religion, class, sex, race, and so forth. On a second axis reflecting
conceptions of the internal dynamics of society and the role of the
state, one may contrast the atomistic and individualistic views of whigs

5. Seymour Martin Lipset has written a series of detailed analyses of differences between
Canadian and United States political culture. See S. LIPSET, North American LaborMovements:
A Comparative Perspective, in UNIONS IN TRANSITION 421 (1986); Lipset, Canada and the
United States: The Cultural Dimension, in CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 109, 134-44
(C. Doran & J. Sigler eds. 1985); Lipset, Why No Socialismin the United States?, in 1 SOURCES
OF CONTEMPORARY RADICALISM 31-149, 346-63 (S.Bialer & S. Sluzar eds. 1977). A slightly
more impressionistic picture is painted in E. FRIEDENBERG, DEFERENCE TO AUTHORITY
(1980).
The recent rediscovery of republican virtue by United States constitutional scholars, see,
e.g., Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986), is viewed with some
amusement in Canada. Many of the concerns raised for reconsideration have never been absent
from Canadian political discourse. See also Symposium: Law and Community, 84 MICH. L.
REv. 1373 (1986) (a further contribution to the resurrection of this issue in American law).
Nevertheless, it is important to signal that the term "community" in today's republican political
discourse is not the communitarianism of organic political ideologies such as toryism or socialism.
See HOROWITZ, supra note 4.
6. Although traces of other ideologies, such as libertarianism, anarchism, Marxism, social
corporatism, and fascism may be found, as yet these credos have managed neither to attract
widespread adherence nor to have made much contribution to ongoing political and legal discourse. For an analysis of the impact of Marxism on the Canadian labour movement, see I.
ABELLA, NATIONALISM, COMMUNISM AND CANADIAN LABOUR: THE CIO, THE COM!IUNIST

PARTY AND THE CANADIAN CONGRESS OF LABOUR 1935-1956 (1973), and for a parallel treatment of corporatist, right-wing movements, see M. STEIN, THE DYNAIICS OF RIGHT-WING
PROTEST: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL CREDIT IN QUEBEC (1973).
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and liberals with organic and communitarian views of tories and
socialists.
In eighteenth century liberal theory, equality of opportunity was
the fundamental assumption. Even in its late nineteenth century
United States version -

democratic liberalism -

the state was con-

ceded no function other than to establish a legal guarantee of equal
opportunity to individuals, recognizing that equal opportunity might
not always be "naturally" present. Conversely, tory and socialist views
are founded on the recognition of class or inequality. While tories see
active government as a means of reconciling citizens to their proper
station in life, socialists argue the contrary. Legislative programmes
aimed at equality of condition are one of the primary goals of active
government.
Until recently, toryism (in Quebec, ultramontainism) has had an
impact on Canadian political culture second only to traditional democratic liberalism. For tories, values such as ascriptivism and elitism
predominate over values like achievement and egalitarianism. 7 The
tory commitment to order as a pre-condition of freedom has meant
the expression "Law and Order" has few of the repressive connotations
so familiar to liberals. The conception of the state as a fundamental
social institution, similar to the church, the family, the local community, the trade union, and profession, supports a belief in its capacities
and its duty to assure the basic needs of citizens. Hence, in Canada
there are many fewer of what de Tocqueville characterizes as mediating and voluntary private institutions, and many more state sponsored
or para-public mediating and non-voluntary institutions, including established religions.
The tory perspective is also reflected in the Canadian commitment
to state education and semi-public philanthropy through the establishment of religion and the early creation of public workhouses, hospitals,
and orphanages. Tories believe not only that enterprise should not be
free, but to use the language of welfare economics, the cost of both
economic and social development should be externalized to the state.
Thus, Canadian conservatives advocate the use of public power to
achieve national purposes and to order market forces in the name of
the common good. In fact, they show great willingness to employ

7.

The vocabulary and analysis here and in the next few paragraphs is adapted from T.

PARSONS, R. BALES, & E. SHILS, WORKING PAPERS IN THE THEORY OF ACTION (1953).

For its application to Canada, see W.

CLEMENT, THE CANADIAN CORPORATE ELITE: AN
ANALYSIS OF ECONOIC POWER (1975); J. PORTER, THE VERTICAL MOSAIC: AN ANALYSIS
OF SOCIAL CLASS AND POWER IN CANADA

(1965).
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public enterprise in the development and exploitation of transportation, utilities, energy, communications, and financial institutions.
Despite the dominance of democratic liberal and tory ideologies,
an unmistakable strain of eighteenth-century whig liberalism persists
in Canadian political culture. Some theorists argue that both toryism
and whiggism are simply justifications for elite domination and exploitation, but at the rhetorical level whiggism is distinct in at least two
ways.
A first notable attribute of whiggism is that it links material
achievement to superiority in directing political and economic affairs.
For example, whigs think that a government, once elected, should be
free to pursue its policies relatively unhampered until the next election.8 The same perspective is reflected in the concession of monopolies
and protected market shares to economic entrepreneurs, be these land
development corporations, transportation conglomerates, private immigration companies in the nineteenth century, or energy, telecommunications, mining, and forestry franchises in the twentieth century.
Canada's selective high tariff policy, its Delawaresque corporate law,
the creation of a Bank of Canada and restrictions on entry into banking
further evidence the influence of whig liberalism.
A second notable attribute of whiggism is that it sustains an
economically-based deferential posture towards public institutions and
legal constraints. Governmental and para-governmental institutions
are accepted as social structures that regulate human intercourse so
as to compensate for the perceived anarchy of unregulated markets.
Market-inefficient regulatory devices were consciously adopted either
to encourage the development of indigenous enterprise, or to sustain
uncompetitive existing businesses. Whigs typically want to play in the
market, sounding the clarion call of free enterprise, but only when
the market is already regulated in their favor.
Socialism is yet another major ideological tradition in Canada. As
a non-liberal ideology, the socialist perspective is distinguished from
toryism in the former's commitment to egalitarian distributive measures such as old-age pensions, unemployment insurance, and medicare.
The socialist understands these schemes as establishing entitlements
that the state should provide without imposing a means test. Unlike
European socialists, who in effect argue for nationalization of capital,
Canadian socialists argue only for redistribution of rents.

8.

This, of course, is an oft-neglected virtue of the Parliamentary as opposed to the congres-

sional political system.
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Several twentieth century legislative initiatives have a distinctly
socialist tenor. These include government-administered automobile insurance, no-fault workers' compensation, a conciliation model of labour
relations, mediational landlord-tenant schemes, and equity-dispensing
small claims courts. Each is grounded in non-market economic beliefs
and was designed to oust classical market notions, such as property
as sovereignty, freedom of contract, and fault-based liability, along
with their corresponding legal enforcement institutions, from a wide
range of social interactions. In extending egalitarianism to the socioeconomic as well as to the political domain, and in arguing for equality
of condition in addition to mere equality of opportunity, Canadian
socialists have come to accept that a just society cannot be achieved
solely through the formal institutions and processes of corrective justice. Both the common law courts and their adversarial adjudicative
procedures are viewed with scarcely concealed scepticism.
Many features of the Canadian constitutional tradition can be derived by a process of reverse mapping recalcitrant legal phenomena
onto the nation's heterodox political ideology. Even the particular
features of the Charter reflect these contrasting themes. But a second,
more important point emerges from the process: a corollary of diversity
is the absence of ideological hegemony. Canadians typically do not
employ the expression "un-Canadian" to de-legitimize the political
views or programmes of their opponents. Theorists in orthodox political cultures often fail to realize that in order for an idea or a perspective to be un-something, there must be an explicit or tacit dominant
ideological position. 9 This absence of hegemony, reflected even in the
absence of a "sacred" text such as a comprehensive written Constitution, means that a society's most fundamental questions tend to be
perceived primarily as political (changing, substantive, infinite), not

9. Even sophisticated observers of Canadian and United States political culture can understate the extent of ideological heterodoxy in Canada. For example, Seymour Martin Lipset has
written: "The dominant traditions in Canada are statist and communitarian, Tory and socialist,
and hierarchically ecclesiastical, Catholic, and Anglican; the American Creed is anti-statist and
individualistic, classically liberal or libertarian, and voluntary, egalitarian and congregational,
Protestant sectarian." S. Lipset, Comments on Freedoms of Association and Industrial and
Labor Policy under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 25 (unpublished manuscript
from Liberty Fund/Fraser Inst. Symposium, Toronto, Ont., Apr. 10-13, 1986). Lipset also
observes: "[tihe United States . . . is the purist example of a non-European non-aristocratic
society. It is distinguished from other western countries, including Canada, as a pure bourgeois,
pure liberal, born-modern culture." Id. at 21. While I am prepared to take on faith Lipset's
analysis of United States political culture, it seems to me that his evidence for claiming dominance
of one ideological tradition in Canada is not persuasive.
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legal (static, procedural, finite). Today, these fundamental questions
prompt debate about the universality of social welfare programmes,
the abolition of capital punishment, limits upon free enterprise and
private property, the availability of abortions, and even the need for
an entrenched constitutional bill of rights. 10 The urge to legalize basic
policy choices characteristically flows from impoverished political debate and its accompanying false consensus. Because ideological diversity in Canada generates substantive political debate, one sees less
recourse to the surrogate legal cram-down of substantive due process.
B.

Constitutional Traditions

It is, of course, relatively easy to report distinctive features of
Canadian political culture in the abstract, and to offer anecdotal evidence of how this culture may have influenced contemporary Canadian
legal culture and institutions. But to do so without also examining
Canada's constitutional antecedents betrays a naive determinism as
between ideology and cultural artifact: legal culture is itself a semi-independent variable. For this reason it is also necessary to note those
elements of the Canadian constitutional tradition that do not neatly
fit the United States model of legal liberalism. Many of the surviving
non-liberal elements of Canadian constitutional law may be traced
directly to its English origins. Three britannic attivisms persist: first,
the common law character of the Constitution; second, the survival of
the concept of Parliamentary sovereignty; and third, the attenuated
nature of the separation of powers theory, especially in relation to
the role of the courts."
To note that the Constitution arises at common law implies a congeries of ideas. Most important, it means that the fundamental ideological elements of the Canadian Constitution are unwritten. This remains
no less true notwithstanding that these unwritten rules flesh out a
legislative skeleton enacted by the Imperial Parliament of the United

10. For a summary of the arguments on both sides of this last issue, see D. SCHMEISER,
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN CANADA (1964); Macdonald, Postscriptand Prelude: The Jurisprudence
qf the Charter- Eight Theses (1982), 4 Sup. CT. L. REV. 321.

11. For the two best sources on general principles of Canadian constitutional law, see P.
HOGG, supra note 2, at ch. 1-14; Scott, The Constitution, Government and Legal System of
Canada, in DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA ch. 2 (H. Stikeman ed. 1985). The former, comprising
the introductory chapters in a textbook for first year law students, presents legal orthodoxy
primarily from a liberal perspective. The latter, a brief chapter in a compendium directed to
American business lawyers, betrays a distinctly non-liberal point of view in both vocabulary
and style.
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Kingdom. For example, the distribution of legislative powers between
federal and provincial governments issues from the Imperial Parliament's Constitution Act, 1867. The Canada Act 1982, also an Imperial
statute, incorporates a written bill of rights into the Constitution,
along with a non-inclusive definition of that constitution that refers
only to legislative instruments.
Written rules and statutes do not preempt other sources of Canadian constitutional law. The Royal Prerogative, constitutional conventions, and especially the unwritten common law, as common law courts
identify and interpret it, remain crucial sources. Many topics canvassed
by articles I through III of the United States Constitution, and almost
all the provisions set out in the first ten amendments thereto, have
2
an equivalent in common law rules of the Canadian Constitution.
Also traceable to the notion of an unwritten constitution is the continuing public law significance of common law methodology. The absence
of a single constitutive text encourages, if not compels, lawyers and
judges constantly to rearticulate these fundamental common law rules.
To read a written constitution is an exercise in interpretation; to
reconstitute an unwritten constitution is an exercise in hermeneutics. 3
A second feature of Canadian constitutionalism is its fidelity to the
concept of Parliamentary sovereignty. Even though both the very
notion of federalism and the civil liberties prescriptions of the Charter
restrict the absolute scope of Parliamentary sovereignty as announced
by A.V. Dicey, and even though section 52 of the Constitution Act,
1982 now codifies the principle of judicial review of legislation, much
of the formal doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty survives. For
example, federal inter-delegation to administrative agencies can trump
distribution of powers curial supervision. Furthermore, by permitting
legislatures to preclude the operation of much of the Charter by simple
majority vote, and by explicitly conditioning judicial review to cases
where limitations on Charter rights are not "demonstrably justified

12. This is not to claim that similar unwritten rules and conventions do not permeate the
United States Constitution. Rather, the point is that in Canada these have legitimacy as common
law rules of the constitution, whereas in the United States it is typically necessary to piggyback
these on the written text of the 1783 document. See, e.g., Grey, Do We Have an Unmitten
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1974-75) (setting forth ideologies underlying American
view of constitutionalism and interpretive debates Constitution has spawned). A particularly
illuminating discussion of recent interpretive trends may be found in Golding, Sacred Texts and
Authority in ConstitutionalInterpretation,in AUTHORITY REVISITED, Norsos XXIX 267 (J.
Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1987).
13. For a particularly apt characterization of this property of unwritten constitutions, see
Fuller, American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century, 6 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 457, 464 (1954).
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in a free and democratic society," the constitution assumes no prepolit-

ical zone of natural rights that is immune from legislative initiative.
Parliamentary, sovereignty also implies that the wisdom or policy of
legislation is not per se reviewable by the judiciary.
In counterpoint, however, Parliamentary sovereignty itself is a
common law constitutional doctrine. Non-federalist and non-Charter

review on common law principles survives intact. Finally, as in the
United States, the actual scope of Parliamentary sovereignty is contingent upon prevailing conceptions of judicial activism and deference.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the relationship between the principle of
Parliamentary sovereignty and other common law principles of the
constitution implies a complex and continual process of political
choice. 14
A third element of Canada's constitutional tradition is the attenuated separation of powers theory that underlies it. Although Montesquieu's initial derivation was from English practice, the theory
never held in the United Kingdom exactly as he reported. Today
commentators focus on the conjunction of executive and legislative
branches inherent in a Parliamentary system as evidence that Montesquieu's thesis is overstated, but in fact the ambivalent position of the
senior judiciary is most revealing.
The Judicature provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867 take up
the principles of the Act of Settlement of 1701, and provide for tenure
during good behaviour, removal only upon joint address of the Senate
and House of Commons, and Parliamentary control over salaries, all
thought to constitute the essence of judicial independence.1 In practice, however, judges are often neither conceived of nor treated as

14. In Canada the nature of this relationship has most frequently been revealed in litigation
over constitutional conventions. See Re Upper House, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 54 (federal Parliament
not empowered unilaterally to modify composition of Senate); Re Resolution to Amend the
Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 (federal Parliament not competent to repatriate Constitution
Act, 1867 without substantial provincial consent); Re Quebec Veto, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 793 (concurrence of legislature of Quebec not needed to repatriate Constitution Act, 1867). The extent of
judicial deference to the will of Parliament has also been argued in litigation touching the
meaning of the Rule of Law and the related notion of an implied Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Re
Alberta Statutes, 1938 S.C.R. 100; Saumur v. City of Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299; Roncarelli
v. Duplessis, 1959 S.C.R. 121; Re Anti-Inflation Act, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373; Manitoba Language
Rights Reference, 59 N.R. 321 (S.C.C. 1985).
15. The best examination of this issue in Canada remains Lederman, The Independence of
the Judicia-y, 34 CAN. BAR REV. 769, 1139 (1956). For a more recent discussion, see Eliot,
Reference Re Establishment of Unified Criminal Court of New Brunswick, 16 U.B.C.L. REV.
313 (1982).
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constitutionally independent actors. For certain purposes they may
even be seen as an arm of government. They are called on to decide
reference cases submitted by the Cabinet; frequently they are conscripted to undertake Royal Commissions of Inquiry not unlike the
investigation into the Kennedy assassination chaired by Chief Justice
Warren.
The Chief Justice of Canada is the Deputy Governor-General, and
upon nomination, any Justice of the Supreme Court may act in his
stead. The judicial appointing power is vested exclusively in the executive, and mobility between cabinet and judiciary has not been infrequent. Constitutionally permissible encroachments on the substance
of Superior Court authority continue, despite a rash of cases seemingly
guaranteeing to Superior Courts a core of substantive jurisdiction that
cannot be assigned to administrative tribunals or executive delegates.
One might conclude that the Judicature provisions of the Constitution
Act, 1867 were not intended to, and do not, guarantee the independence of judges and the inviolability of their substantive jurisdiction
as this notion is commonly conceived in liberal political rhetoric.
Rather, they guarantee the independence of the Judiciary by preserving the jurisdiction of common law courts to elaborate the fundamental
principles of the constitution.16
C.

Legal Ideology

Despite the survival of these basic constitutional doctrines, it remains difficult to determine how much of Canada's legal culture is
directly derivable from English experience, and how much either results from the transplantation of American practice into British constitutional soil, or is truly indigenous. This is especially evident in
areas where commentators puzzle over the extent to which Dicey's
conception of the Rule of Law actually permeates constitutional law
and practice.
To recall, Dicey claimed that the Rule of Law comprised a trilogy
of related principles. 17 First, Dicey assumed that law is essentially a
static common law, and legal change could occur only by means of

16. I have developed this theme in greater detail in Macdonald, The Proposed Section 96B:
An Ill-Conceived Reform Destined to Failure, 26 C. DE D. 251 (1985). It should be noted,
however, that few commentators share this perspective on the meaning of the expression "independence of the judiciary."
17.

See A.

DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION

39-86, 183-205, 406-16 (10th ed. 1959). These principles have been recast slightly so as to
emphasize their impact on the discussion at hand.
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formally individuated legislative rules woven into the common law by
ordinary courts. Non-Parliamentary subordinate legislation and delegations of discretionary powers to public officials were to be avoided
or strictly circumscribed. Second, Dicey held an absolutist and instrumentalist view of legislation. Provided that Parliament used sufficiently explicit terms, the statutory form could be deployed to accomplish any goal, notwithstanding pre-existing common law rules to
the contrary. Third, Dicey advocated a sharp distinction between law
and politics. The objectivity of law could be maintained only if all
questions of social policy were compressed into Parliamentary legislation applied by independent common law courts.
Modern commentators recognize the defects of the Diceyan vision
and the late nineteenth century excesses it reflected. Yet the theoretical upshot of Dicey's three assumptions for the courts - an aspiration
to a Weberian " "formally rational" conception of adjudication - remains firmly entrenched in Canadian legal culture. This aspiration is
quite different from that revealed in the "substantively irrational" role
overtly played by the United States Supreme Court. Canadian constitutional politics in the courts are predominantly consequentialist;
United States constitutional politics in the courts are predominantly
constitutive. The Canadian judiciary has always understood its role
to be to preserve "peace, order, and good government 19 rather than
to guarantee "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
Although this synopsis of Canadian political and legal culture is
insufficiently nuanced, it offers an overall perspective from which to
view both the Canadian constitutional tradition and the artifacts it
has generated. To evaluate properly the scope and impact of due
process standards such as natural justice and fundamental justice, one
must know the context within which such concepts are wielded. In
particular, one must put aside assumptions that flow from United
States political culture - notably, liberal views about the respective
roles of government and the courts, the need to elaborate written due
process guarantees to protect minorities from majorities, and the function of markets and private property in enhancing individual freedom.
One must also distance oneself from assumptions that are grounded

18. For an analysis of Max Weber's theory of legal rational authority, see Max Weber on
Law in Economy and Society (l. Rheinstein & E. Shils trans. 1954), especially the introduction
by Max Rheinstein at pages xlii-lii. See generally A. KRONAIAN, MAX WEBER 72-95 (1983).
19. The phrase "peace, order and good government" appears in the Preamble to section 91
of the British North America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c.3. Section 91 sets out the legislative
powers of the Parliament of Canada.
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in United States legal culture - notably, the obliteration of the distinction between law and politics, with a concomitant politicizing of the
judiciary and judicializing of political, processes; and the promotion of
adversarial adjudication as an optimal model of social decision-making.
III.

NATURAL JUSTICE AND PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
AT COMMON LAW

Many commentators believe Canada went through a constitutional
revolution on April 17, 1982, when Queen Elizabeth II proclaimed in
force the Canada Act 1982, an enactment of the United Kingdom
Parliament. This revolution was thought to consist of the following
three elements. For the first time, the formal power to amend all
aspects of the Canadian constitution was vested solely in Canadian
institutions, and not, as previously, partially in the Parliament of the
United Kingdom. Second, the right of judicial review of legislation
and the supremacy of the Constitution, long a feature of Canadian
constitutional practice, achieved explicit formulation. Third, civil liberties guarantees such as those reflected in the first ten amendments
to the United States Constitution were enacted into a constitutional
document, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
All three developments are important to determining the current
content of standards of procedural due process in Canada, although
for present purposes the third is clearly most significant. The key due
process provision of the Charter is section 7, which provides that:
"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the
''
principles of fundamental justice. 20
Section 7 might strike the casual observer as indeed revolutionary,
but when seen more broadly in the Canadian constitutional tradition,
this parroting of the fifth amendment cannot aspire to such pretension.
Even before the adoption of the Charter, Canadian constitutional law
had been visited, under the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights, with both
a due process and a fundamental justice standard. 21 Moreover, Cana-

20. Constitution Act, 1982, pt. I, §§ 1-34, Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11, sched. B (U.K.)
(emphasis added).
21. Section 1(a) of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights provided for the right to "life, liberty,
security of the person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof
except by due process of law." Section 2(e) of the same Act guaranteed to litigants and accused
"a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Nevertheless, the
guarantees of the Canadian Bill of Rights did not generate any significant level of judicial
activity on procedural due process questions. For a thorough discussion of §§ 1(a) & 2(e), see
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dian public law already incorporated a highly sophisticated theory of
procedural due process. This theory rested on a longstanding common
law concept: natural justice.2 Quite apart from these explicit statutory
and common law due process norms, the Canadian Constitution has
always contained a variety of implicit norms that find expression in
diverse techniques of judicial implication.2 Since the Charter neither
repealed the Bill of Rights, nor abolished the natural justice and procedural fairness standards, nor otherwise restructured the fundamental principles of constitutional jurisprudence, any assessment of the
overall framework of due process guarantees in Canadian public law
must commence with a review of the pre-Charter position.
A.

Judicial Strategies to Sustain Due Process Values

One may usefully begin discussion of common law judicial review
for due process by recalling the theory of Parliamentary sovereignty.
The interaction of the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty with
other common law principles of the constitution is difficult to state
precisely. Courts have often reiterated that the common law is logically
prior to and formally constitutive of the doctrine of Parliamentary
sovereignty.1 However, most substantive common law constitutional
doctrines, such as the subservience of the Royal Prerogative to the
common law, the principle that executive action must be justified by
law, and the abrogration of the Crown's dispensing power, constitute
limits on the executive and not on Parliament. 25 Only rarely and in

P. HOGG, supra note 2, at 64546, 743-49; W. TARNOPOLSKY, THE CANADIAN BILL OF RIGHTS
259-74 (1975).
22. In the late 1970s, a "new natural justice" known as procedural fairness was recognized
by the courts. For a detailed study of the emergence of procedural fairness, see Loughlin,
ProceduralFairness:A Study of the Crisis in Administrative Law Theory, 18 U. TORONTO
L.J. 215 (1978); Macdonald, Judicial Review and ProceduralFairness in Administrative Law
(pts. 1 & 2), 25 McGILL L.J. 520 (1979-1980), 26 McGILL L.J. 1 (1980-1981); Mullan, Fairness:
The New Natural Justice, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 281 (1975). While natural justice is the epithet
most often applied to the common law of procedural due process, one also finds judicial reference
to the following- substantial justice, universal justice, rational justice, British justice, English
speaking justice, the essence of justice, and even justice without any epithet. See S. DESMITH,
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 156-58 (J. Evans 4th ed. 1980).
23. For analysis of these techniques, see P. HOGG, supra note 2, at 313-51; B. STRAYER,
THE CANADIAN CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS (2d ed. 1983).
24. See, e.g., Re Initiative and Referendum Act, 1919 A.C. 935 (P.C.) (parliamentary process
cannot be limited by plebiscite); Alliance des professeurs de Montreal v. Attorney-Gen. of Que.,
21 D.L.R.4th 354 (Que. C.A. 1985) (omnibus statutory override not sufficient on manner and
form grounds to oust Charter).
25. See Case of Proclamations, 12 Co. Rep. 74, 77 Eng. Rep. 1352 (K.B. 1610) (common
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oblique ways have Canadian courts asserted the supremacy of the
common law over validly enacted Parliamentary legislation. 26 Yet it
is obvious that courts will not necessarily enforce (or enforce as Parliament may have intended) all statutes that have been validly enacted.

At least four techniques have been adopted to confess and avoid on
the issue of Parliamentary sovereignty while at the same time reviewing state action on due process or other civil liberties grounds.z
First, courts may find refuge in the doctrine of constitutional ultra
vires. Ever since Canada became a federal state in 1867, courts have
been charged with allocating legislative authority as between national

law determines scope of Royal prerogative); Entick v. Carrington, 19 St. Tr. 1030, 95 Eng.
Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765) (all government acts must be justified by law); Regina v. Catagas, 81
D.L.R.3d 396 (Man. C.A. 1977) (Crown does not have power to suspend operation of statute).
26. In the 1950s and early 1960s, there were several suggestions that the preamble to the
Constitution Act, 1867, which gives Canada a "Constitution similar in principle to that of the
United Kingdom," and the very notion of parliamentary government itself were evidence of an
"implied Bill of Rights," which courts could invoke to control parliamentary sovereignty. These
dicta, reminiscent of Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 114a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646 (K.B. 1610), first
appeared in Re Alberta Statutes, 1938 S.C.R. 100. They were repeated in Saumur v. City of
Quebec, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299; Switzman v. Elbling, 1957 S.C.R. 285; 0il, Chem. & Atomic
Workers v. Imperial Oil, 1963 S.C.R. 584. In no case, however, was the notion of an implied
Bill of Rights held out as a ground for decision. Between 1963 and 1978, the Supreme Court
did not advert to the notion, and in Attorney Gen. for Can. v. City of Montreal, [1978] 2 S.C.R.
770, it seems to have been abandoned. Nevertheless, in the post-Charter era there is evidence
of its resurrection. See Re Fraser & Pub. Serv. Staff Relation Bd., 23 D.L.R.4th 122, 128
(S.C.C. 1985), in which, without expressly using the phrase "implied Bill of Rights," Chief
Justice Dickson suggests that "freedom of speech is a deep-rooted value in our democratic
system of government. It is a principle of our common law Constitution, inherited from the
United Kingdom by virtue of the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867." Although Fraser
was a non-Charter case, similar statements may be found in Charter cases. See Retail, Wholesale
& Dep't Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 33 D.L.R.4th 174 (S.C.C. 1987), in
which McIntyre, J., again without expressly using the phrase 'Implied Bill of Rights," stated:
"Prior to the adoption of the Charter,freedom of speech and expression had been recognized
as an essential feature of Canadian parliamentary democracy. Indeed, this Court may be said
to have given it constitutional status." For an overview of the failings-of the implied Bill of
Rights technique, see D. GIBSON, supra note 2, at 1-12; see also T. BERGER, FRAGILE FREEDOmS: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISSENT IN CANADA (1981) (a chronicle of human rights abuses
in Canada and the reluctance of courts to check offensive legislation). The implied Bill of Rights
thesis has also appeared in New Zealand. For a chronicle and assessment, see Joseph & Walker,
A Theory of ConstitutionalChange, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155, 156-57 (1987).
27. These techniques, while no doubt also deployed in the United States, probably are less
developed because of explicit due process constitutional rhetoric, and because of the entrenchment
of judicial review under Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In other words,
the reality of procedural due process review is revealed not only in constitutional texts; the
current state of civil liberties in a given polity is a question of fact, not a question of legal doctrine.
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and provincial governments on the basis of constitutional texts. While
some commentators claim to find a coherent textual rationale for at
least most such distributive decisions, the majority acknowledge that
the allocative function has never been a purely formal exegetical exercise. In other words, the sometimes acrobatic jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court prior to 1982 is much more than a demonstration of
arcane and overrefined techniques of judicial implication. Where statutes provide for egregious transgressions upon civil liberties, courts
may, even in the absence of a Bill of Rights, and without the need
to invoke fundamental common law principles, simply strike them
down as falling outside "federal" or "provincial" legislative jurisdiction,
as the case may be. 28
Second, Canadian courts have occasionally deployed, in parallel
fashion to American courts, a series of doctrines through which access
to judicial enforcement mechanisms may be denied. Even though principles such as standing, ripeness, exhaustion, mootness, and the political question doctrine often are used to deny judicial review to those
asserting civil liberties claims, they also may be deployed to the opposite effect. Thus one finds courts refusing to enforce contempt citations
for breach of an injunction, dismissing prosecutions under colorable
legislation, and declining to homologate doubtful administrative orders,
not on the basis of any substantive defect but rather on grounds
perceived to be tied to the institutional integrity of the judicial function.29
Third, at the point of application of validly enacted statutes that
delegate executive authority, the judiciary has been able to assert due
process review under the guise of its ordinary, common law supervis-

28. This strategy is discussed in detail in P. WEILER, IN THE LAST RESORT 186-95 (1974).
Weiler objects, however, to this dissimulation on the grounds that (1) it disrupts the distributive
scheme of the Constitution, and (2) it undervalues and understates civil liberties questions. See
Weiler, The Supreme Court of Canada and the Law of CanadianFederalism,23 U. TORONTO
L.J. 307, 344-52 (1973). My own position on this issue is to the contrary: we often protect our
most cherished values by refusing to let them become the subject of debate, especially in the
courts. See Macdonald, Pour la reconnaissanced'une normativit jurdiqueimplicite et inftrentielle, 18 SOCIOLOGIE ET SOCIETEs 47 (1986).
29. To date no Canadian commentator has elaborated a complete theory of passive virtues
that parallels the theory of A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) and A.
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970). Once again, this probably
results because Canadian courts typically have not been required to adjudicate due process
claims of right grounded in constitutional texts. For an attempt to apply Bickel's thesis in a
limited context, see Macdonald, The Commission of Inquiry in the Perspectiveof Administrative
Law, 18 ALTA. L. REV. 366, 386-95 (1980).
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ory jurisdiction. Just as Canadian courts have adeptly wielded the
constitutional ultra vires doctrine in aid of due process values, they
have also generated complex theories of agency jurisdiction (or legislative ultra vires) to circumscribe administrative and executive behaviour. Both substantive and procedural review of civil liberties questions often is exercised through such delitescent doctrines as "jurisdictional fact," "fettering discretion," "asking the wrong question," "taking into account an irrelevant consideration," and "acting for an improper purpose."' ° Here again the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty
is explicitly acknowledged and implicitly restrained.
Fourth, courts have been especially resourceful in invoking a wide
variety of common law presumptions that they have characterized as
constitutional canons of judicial implication. These presumptions,
supplied by courts ostensibly to supply the omission of Parliament,
are routinely deployed, along with the ordinary rules of statutory
construction legislatively prescribed in Interpretation Acts, as due
process vehicles. Seven merit enumeration. These are (i) the presumption that access to the common law courts for the ultimate determination of rights and obligations is guaranteed and that no privative clause
can insulate administrative action from judicial review on jurisdictional
grounds; (ii) the presumption that criminal responsibility cannot attach
without mens rea; (iii) the presumption that delegated legislation is
subject, inter alia, to an implied condition of reasonableness; (iv) the
presumption against the sub-delegation of regulatory or enforcement
powers; (v) the presumption, reflected in the maxim "no expropriation
without compensation," that Parliament does not intend to interfere
with the right of private property; (vi) the presumption that official
acts or omissions causing damna also are iniuriaunless lawfully justified; and (vii) the presumption that official decisions affecting rights
must be taken in conformity with the rules of natural justice.31

30. The values at stake in such jurisdictional review are explored in detail by Dussault &
Patenaude, Le contr6le de l'Administration:vers une meilleure synthase des valeurs de libertl
individuelle et de justice sociale?, 43 REVUE DU BARREAU [R. DU B.] 163 (1983). But cf.

Arthurs, ProtectionAgainst JudicialReview, 43 R. DU B. 277 (1983) (arguing that it is precisely
this deployment of jurisdictional rhetoric that makes judicial review so offensive). For a similarly
skeptical assessment of the transparency of grounds for judicial review, see Macdonald, Absence
of Jurisdiction:A Perspective, 43 R. Du B. 307 (1983) [hereinafter Perspective]; Macdonald &
Paskell-Mede, Annual Survey of AdministrativeLaw, 13 OTrAWA L. REV. 677, 685-754 (1981).
31. For a skillful analysis of the implication of several of these presumptions, see Scott,
The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 14 ALTA. L. REV. 97, 100-12 (1976). For an explanation
of an additional presumption in favour of strict construction of "statutes which encroach on the
rights of subjects," see Attorney Gen. of Can. v. Hallet & Carey, 1952 A.C. 427 (P.C.). It
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B.

The Development of Natural Justice

The presumption of natural justice is the most visible procedural
due process standard in Anglo-Canadian law and seems to be the
closest analogue to both the fifth amendment and section 7 of the
Charter.s Amidst seventeenth century impeachments, treason, royal
intrigue, and civil war, the Court of King's Bench first came to state
the idea of natural justice as two rules: audi alteram partem (let the
other party be heard), and nemo iudex in causa sua debet esse (let
no man be a judge in his own cause). More colloquially, these rules
were understood to ensure parties the right to adequate notice precedent to an opportunity to be heard, and the right to an impartial and
disinterested decision-maker.33
Some interpret the early cases as suggesting that natural justice
had only a procedural content and applied only to adjudications. It is
true that the standard typically was invoked as a procedural control
over the exercise of statutory powers granted to the lower-level
judiciary, such as magistrates and sewers commissioners, or over the
process of disenfranchising office-holders. But several natural justice
cases did not fit this monolithic, purely procedural model of due process. Many seventeeth century decisions, and scattered cases as recently as the late nineteenth century, implied both a procedural and
a substantive content to natural justice. While few judges accepted
Lord Coke's invitation in Dr. Bonham's Case to assert common law's
supremacy over Parliamentary legislation,4 most cared little about

would now seem, however, that this presumption applies mainly in respect to delegated legisla-

tion. Debate continues on whether these presumptions are merely a reflection of Parliament's
implied intent (that is, whether they are maxims of statutory interpretation) or whether they
are truly principles of the common law constitution (that is, whether they in some measure are
antecedent to parliamentary legislation in the sense that they do not require statutory "am-

biguity" as a precondition to their invocation).
32.

Of course, the informed legal theorist cannot ignore the panoply of other presumptions,

interpretive strategies, legal techniques, and constitutional mechanisms that reinforce and sustain
the natural justice presumption. The most comprehensive pre-Charter discussion may be found
in Willis, Administrative Law and thweB.N.A. Act, 53 HARV. L. REV. 251 (1939).
33. The leading treatment of the content of the rules of natural justice is that of S. DESMITH,

supra note 22, at chs. 4 & 5. For detailed development, with slight variations, of the historical
account set out in the next seven paragraphs, see id.; Loughlin, supra note 22; R. Macdonald,
supra note 22.
34. Coke proclaimed

[i]n
many cases, the common law will control Acts of Parliament, and sometimes
adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an act of Parliament is against common
right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law
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whether they were in fact making substantive determinations in reviewing for breaches of natural justice. Over the same period courts
were also less concerned with strictly delimiting the types of decisionmaking activity subject to natural justice review, probably because
the very concept of adjudication in King's Bench was not settled. On
certiorari, courts questioned licensing procedures and local government ordinances as routinely as magistrates' decisions.",
By the early twentieth century, however, the meaning of natural
justice had narrowed considerably. Common law courts had not only
repudiated Dr. Bonham's Case but had also adopted a surprisingly
restrictive definition of procedural error. These developments, coupled
with an elaborate and conservative threshold test for identifying reviewable adjudications, meant that judges were declining to question
decisionmaking procedures over a wide range of statutory delegations.
In fact, the 1950s saw most commentators lamenting the demise of
natural justice. The standard at that time possessed four attributes:
it was a common law principle; it had only a procedural content; it
was a formal and adjudication-modelled concept; and it was a narrowly
rule-defined doctrine.
Because the natural justice standard was a common law concept,
express legislative language could override it. Moreover, both the
content of legislation and the procedures for passing it were beyond
the control of the courts. Were Parliament to have provided that an
administrative agency could decide cases in which it had a clear
pecuniary interest, or that a party could be deprived of license or
permit without a hearing, then a reviewing court would have been
unable to invoke a breach of the rules of natural justice as grounds
for quashing agency action taken pursuant to such legislation.
Again, because natural justice was gradually restricted to matters
of procedure, reviewing courts could not use it as a basis for inquiring
directly into the merits of an administrative determination. In principle, even a grossly unfair or capricious decision was unassailable on
natural justice grounds if the decisionmaker were unbiased and had
afforded a hearing. Any challenge required the use of other judicial
review doctrines, which were in fact deployed to raise substantive
due process issues.

will controul it, and adjudge such act to be void.
Bonham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 114a, 77 E.R. 646 (K.B. 1610)
35. An oft-cited case is Cooper v. Wandsworth Bd. of Works, 14 Co. B. 180 (N.S. 1863).
The Court held that natural justice was applicable "to many exercises of power which in common
understanding would not be at all more a judicial proceeding than would be the act of the
district board in ordering the house to be pulled down." Id. at 188.
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As a formal and adjudication-modelled concept, natural justice was
rarely applied when decisionmakers undertook legislative, policymaking, or executive acts. The standard could be invoked only if a "judicial
or quasi-judicial" function were in issue. Such functions occurred when
decisions "affected strict legal rights" and when the governing statute
actually imposed upon the decisionmaker a "duty to act judicially." In
other words, courts habitually restricted the application of the standard to adjudications upon questions of a legal right to life, liberty,
and property. Invariably, courts held that cases such as parole revocations and welfare claims processing did not involve the adjudication
of a legal right.
Natural justice also became a rule-focused review doctrine. Some
courts continued to insist that natural justice was a flexible standard
whose precise content could be tailored to fit any type of adjudication
or quasi-adjudication, but in practice the two "rules of natural justice"
had acquired a precise and defined content. With rare exceptions
courts and commentators agreed on the specific requirements of natural justice, requirements that would be applied indiscriminately to
all administrative activity.
Together these four attributes evidenced a law of due process that
had all the characteristics of a suppletive procedural Code whose content closely resembled the common law court's Rules of Practice. The
audi alteram partem principle became little more than an orthodox
inventory of trial-type procedures. 6 Similarly, the nemo iudex principle meant only that the decisionmaker should display a judicial temperament.3 7 Thus, by mid-century natural justice was reduced to a
series of discrete due process rules relating to the right to a hearing
before an impartial tribunal, and the rules themselves were thought
to reflect the procedural essence of adversarial adjudication.

36. Typically, this inventory was held to comprise the following rights: (1) the right ,to
adequate notice of a hearing; (2) the right to pre-hearing discovery; (3) the right to an adjournment; (4) the right to counsel; (5) the right to call witnesses and submit documents; (6) the
light to cross-examine adverse witnesses and to refute prejudicial material; (7) the right to a
transcript; and, if requested, (8) the right to reasons for decision.
37. One way to state the presumption relating to bias or interest is that the decisionnaker
(1) would be free from any pecuniary, moral, or professional interest in the outcome of the
decision; (2) would not demonstrate any prejudicial conduct in the hearing; (3) would not be
sitting in appeal of its own prior decisions; (4) would not be exercising a hybrid role of prosecutor
and judge; and (5) would not have made any prior declaration or engaged in any prior activity
suggestive of attitudinal bias.
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The Emergence of ProceduralFairness

Paradoxically, just as this orthodoxy was achieving explicit doctrinal and legislative recognition, courts in the United Kingdom began
to loosen their own self-imposed fetters. Judges appeared simply to
be broadening the range of reviewable agency decision, without otherwise changing either the grounds for, or the content of, due process
review. They seemed only to be revising the criteria for characterizing
an agency decision as judicial. They significantly relaxed the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate an impact on his "legal rights."
Decisions affecting mere "privileges," "economic interests," or even
"legitimate expectations" were considered sufficiently important to
give rise to due process protection. In addition, judges restated the
requirement that the statute under review actually impose a "duty to
act judicially," and instead permitted such a duty merely to be inferred
from the extent of the power exercised.38
While courts were broadening the scope of procedural review they
were also reworking the other aspects of natural justice. Gradually,
due process review acquired a firmer constitutional footing. There
developed widespread use of negative privative clauses purportedly
ousting the power of judicial review, and positive privative clauses
granting decisionmaking power in subjective terms, or explicitly
excluding natural justice. In reaction, courts deduced new categories
of reviewable jurisdictional error.s9 Courts also began to accept scholarly blandishment urging substantive review, 40 and arguing for flexible
procedural norms. 41 Only the rule-defined character of natural justice
42
seemed to survive developments of the 1960s and 1970s.
In Canada this jurisprudential evolution peaked in two Supreme
Court cases. A 1977 case, Re Nicholson & Halimand-NorfolkRegional

38. The first House of Lords case reflecting these developments was Ridge v. Baldwin,
1964 A.C. 40.
39. See Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Comm'n, [1969] 2 A.C. 147.
40. The overlap between notions of substantive due process and these newer doctrines is
nicely demonstrated by the House of Lords in Padfield v. Minister of Agric., Fisheries & Food,
1968 A.C. 997.
41. A thorough review of how fairness permits courts to relax the procedural requirements
of a trial-type hearing (for example, oral submissions, cross-examinations, strict rules of evidence,
right to counsel, open proceedings, and the right to reasons) is set out in D. MULLAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW §§ 27-45 (2d ed. 1979); see also D. JONES & A. DE VILLARS, PRINCIPLES OF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 197-239 (1985) (arguing that fairness is natural justice "writ small").
42. See Macdonald, supra note 22, at 543-63, for an exhaustive critique of this attribute of
both traditional and revisionist natural justice.
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Board of Commissions of Police, added a new phrase to the vocabulary
of procedural due process, "procedural fairness. ' ' 43 In adopting the

"fairness" standard the Supreme Court invited due process review of
low-level non-adjudicative statutory discretion granted to administrative officials, and also of high-level executive and Cabinet decisions
grounded in the Royal prerogative. Even rule-making hearings have
been imposed under the fairness doctrine. A 1981 case, Crevier v.
Attorney-Generalfor Quebec, asserted that judicial review could not
be precluded by any provincial enactment purporting to oust the supervisory power of the Superior Courts.44 Crevier only claimed a right
of judicial review notwithstanding a privative clause in the face of a
substantive jurisdictional error by a provincially constituted tribunal.
But it also opens the door to constitutionalizing the right of judicial
review for breaches of natural justice and procedural fairness.
Most commentators hailed these Supreme Court decisions, and
several even advocated that judges consciously readopt the more activist and informalist theory of due process review reflected in the
leading decisions of the early seventeenth century. But some anticipated a crisis in Canadian administrative law theory, on the grounds
that the doctrine could be deployed substantively to resurrect two
discredited aspects of the Diceyan Rule of Law ideology: conservative
politics, and the exhultation of the adversarial adjudication of common
law rights.45 Others expressed process concerns, fearing that courts,
as adjudicative bodies, might not be able to develop a more nuanced
view of the requirements of due process. Instead, they would neither
be institutionally competent to develop non-adjudicative due process
norms, nor able to overcome the legalistic urge to state finite due
46
process rules.
Both these concerns have proved grounded in part. Some lower
courts have toyed with substantive due process review in a haphazard
fashion; 47 and courts generally have not been able to develop alterna-

43.
44.

[1979] 1 S.C.R. 311 (1981).
[1981] 2 S.C.R. 220.

45.

The most trenchant criticisms are those of H.W. Arthurs. See Arthurs, Rethinking

Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business, 17 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (1979); Arthurs,
Jonah and the Whale: The Appearance, Disappearanceand Reappearance of Administrative
Law, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 225 (1980); see also Loughlin, supra note 22 (judicial license implied

by fairness doctrine is dangerous).
46. See Macdonald, supra note 22.
47. See the discussion in Mullan, Natural Justice and Fairness:Substantive as well as
ProceduralStandardsfor the Review of Administrative Decision-Making, 27 MCGILL L.J. 250
(1982); and the polemic by Grey, Can FairnessBe Effective?, 27 MCGILL L.J. 360 (1982).
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tive, non-adjudicative procedural models to guide review decisions. 48
As a "new natural justice," the procedural fairness standard in Canada

is somewhat different from "old natural justice." For example, it may
encompass both substance and procedure, and its invocation is much

less dependent upon formalistic threshold tests. Like procedural fairness in the United Kingdom, however, the standard has not fully
escaped its dual origins in an adjudicative model of decisionmaking and
a concept of due process as a series of finite rules. 49
D.

Other Common Law Due Process Vehicles

The current picture of common law procedural review in Canada
would be incomplete without reference to other legislative and judicial
developments by which due process norms have achieved enhanced
recognition. Over the past two decades, a number of statutes have
been enacted to simplify judicial remedies, to establish other agencies
that enhance due process review, to codify procedural norms, and to
engraft detailed trial-type procedures onto existing administrative discretions. ° While most of the statutes did not bear directly on either
the concept or the content of natural justice, their overall effect has
been to enhance the institutional and remedial context of procedural

48.

See Attorney-Gen. of Can. v. Inuit Tapirisat, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735; D. JONES & A. DE

VILLARS, supra note 41, at 162-96.

49. This is especially evident in early debate on whether natural justice and procedural
fairness constituted distinct procedural standards. See Taylor, Fairnessand Natural Justice Distinct Concepts or Mere Semantics, 3 MONASH L. REV. 191 (1977). For an excellent review
of the development of the fairness doctrine in Canada from 1977-1986, see Garant, La nouvelle
justice naturelle . . . quelques problems de mise en oeuvre, 43 R. DU B. 409 (1983); Garant &
Dussault, L'quit4 procddurale et la rdvolution tranquilledu droit administratif,16 REVUE DE
DROIT (Universit6 de Sherbrooke) [R.D.U.S.] 495, 537-40 (1986).
50. See, e.g., in Ontario, The Judicial Review Procedure Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 224
(1980) (consolidating writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and actions for injunction
and declaration into simplified "Application for Judicial Review"); The Ombudsman Act, ONT.
REV. STAT. ch. 325 (1980) (legislative appointee with broad investigatory and recommendatory
powers); The Statutory Powers Procedure Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 484 (1980) (establishing
mandatory trial-type code of administrative procedures wherever "statutory power of decision"
in issue). The most remarkable statute was Ontario's Civil Rights Statute Law Amendment Act,
ONT. STAT. vol. 2, ch. 49 (1971), which systematically inserted a right to a trial-type hearing
into the decision-making structure of hundreds of existing statutes.
Other initiatives include the creation of a federal judicial review jurisdiction under The
Federal Court Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 10 (2d Supp.), §§ 18, 28 (1970); the regulation of
federal delegated legislation under The Statutory Instruments Act, ch. 38, 1970-1972 Can. Stat.
791; and the opening up of federal records under the Access to Information Act, ch. 111, sched.
1, 1980-1983 Can. Stat. 3321 and the Privacy Act, ch. 111, sched. 2, 1980-1983 Can. Stat. 3378.
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review at common law.51 Even prior to the formal constitutional step

reflected in the Charter, Parliament and the provincial legislatures
were acting to promote due process values in public administration.
The courts kept pace with the legislatures in recognizing the importance of due process in statutory decisionmaking procedures. Constitutional ultra vires retained its traditional place as a due process surrogate, notwithstanding the development of the more flexible procedural
fairness standard.5 2 In addition, novel substantive jurisdictional doc-

trines continued to buttress explicit due process control.s More importantly, the Supreme Court asserted various common law presumptions
with renewed vigour. It significantly reduced the scope of no-mens
rea regulatory offences by developing a third category of criminal
liability;r 4 it restated forcefully the principle of unreasonableness as a
grounds for quashing municipal bylaws;-M it broadened the conditions
under which the delagatus non potest delagare doctrine could be invoked to void agency decisions;56 it extended the no-expropriation-without-compensation rule to implied expropriationsp 7 and it reaffirmed
the common law liability of public officials by holding a provincial
premier liable for slander in the exercise of a purported power to
dismiss a civil servant.58

51. For a brief overview of several of these initiatives, see Macdonald, Big Government
and Its Control: Legislative Initiatives of the Past Decade, in DECADE OF ADJUSTMENT ch.
4 (J. Menezes ed. 1980).
52. Two representative cases are Labatt Breweries of Can. Ltd. v. Attorney Gen. of Can.,
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 914 (federal statute prescribing alcohol content of "lite beer" ultra vires of
Parliament); Westendorp v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 43 (by-law concerning prostitution ultra
vires of municipality/provincial legislature).
53. See Bell v. Ontario Human Rights Comm'n, 1971 S.C.R. 756 (court may review notwithstanding privative clause if agency errs as to jurisdictional, that is, legislative, facts);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 1970 S.C.R. 425, 426
(court may review notwithstanding privative clause if agency "asking itseif the wrong question").
54. Regina v. Sault Ste. Marie, 40 C.C.C.2d 353 (S.C.C. 1978) (distinguishing strict from
absolute liability offences and holding the defence of due diligence open to persons accused of
strict liability offences).
55. Atkinson v. Municipality of Metro. Toronto, 16 N.R. 153 (S.C.R. 1977); Regina v. Bell,
16 N.R. 457 (S.C.C. 1976).
56. Canadian Inst. of Pub. Real Estate Cos. v. Toronto, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 2; Ramawad v.
Minister of Manpower & Immigration, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 375.
57. Manitoba Fisheries v. The Queen, 86 D.L.R.3d 462 (S.C.C. 1978); see also Regina v.
Tener, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 533 (impairment of mining rights in National Park constitutes implied
expropriation).
58. Jones v. Bennett, 1969 S.C.R. 277. For a particularly forceful statement of this principle
by a provincial court of appeal, see Gershman v. Manitoba Vegetable Producers Mktg. Bd., 69
D.L.R.3d 114 (Man. C.A. 1976) (agency liable in damages for nmlafides revocation of marketing
permit).
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Throughout the 1970s, paralleling the development of procedural
fairness as an extension of natural justice, the courts maintained their
traditional inventory of techniques for achieving due process review.
The only due process casualty of the period seems to have been the
long dormant implied Bill of Rights doctrine. Twice the Supreme Court
effectively held that no common law civil liberties guarantee "is so
enshrined in the Constitution as to be beyond the reach of competent
legislation." 59 Yet apart from the temporary enterrement of this one
aspect of the common law constitution, the 1970s' record suggests a
renaissance of the informalist and activist approach to due process
review that had been abandoned at the turn of the century.6

IV.

FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE IN THE
CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

Following Nicholson, procedural due process evolved largely as
sceptical commentators had predicted, but the anticipated crisis in
administrative law theory never materialized. Shortly after Crevier,
the Charter was proclaimed in force. Almost immediately, scholarly
and judicial attention was deflected away from the common law concepts of procedural fairness and natural justice, and away from all
other mechanisms for asserting standards of procedural due process,
and towards the section 7 guarantee of fundamental justice.
But the Charter has done more than simply add a new epithet to
Canadian due process discourse: in changing the rhetoric, it has also
changed the participants. Perhaps more importantly, it has also
changed the way commentators view the political and legal underpinnings of procedural review. Before 1982, United Kingdom-oriented
administrative lawyers, versed in the presumptions of the common

59. See Attorney Gen. for Can. v. City of Montreal, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 770, 796; see also
Attorney Gen. of Can. v. Law Soc'y of B.C., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, 364. But recently the court
seems to be more open to 'implied Bill of Rights" reasoning. See supra note 26.
60. A subsidiary question, which will be discussed fully in the context of a comparison of
natural justice and fundamental justice, concerns the judiciary's overall attitude on the question
of deference to legislative will. For an insightful discussion, see JudicialDeference, supra note
2. In the mid-1970s, in S.E.I.U. v. Nipawin Dist. Staff Nurses Ass'n, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 382 and
C.U.P.E., Local 963 v. N.B. Liquor Corp., [1979] 2 S.C.R. 227, the Supreme Court seemed to
be taking a deferential approach to substantive jurisdictional error. But almost immediately the
trend was reversed. The Court's attitude on common law procedural error seemed to track its
view of substantive error, although it would be hazardous to periodize the Court's due process
jurisprudence on such a criterion. See Morissette, Le contr6le de la competence d'attribution:
th~se, antith~se et synthse, 16 R.D.U.S. 591 (1986) (demonstrating the inherent flux of judicial
approaches to the deference question).
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law and the theory of implied due process review of administrative
action, dominated public law scholarship on due process issues. Since
1982, United States-oriented constitutional lawyers, preoccupied with
statutory norms and entrenched guarantees, have been ascendant.
Before 1982, some scholars viewed procedural due process as primarily
a problem of public administration involving the search for an optimal
match between power and process. Since 1982, most scholars see procedural due process as no more than a vehicle for subjecting all state
action to adjudicative norms. While nothing in the Charter requires
such a result, or precludes traditional administrative law analysis,
today most due process commentators in Canada tend to work outwards from section 7. To understand how these constitutionalists interpret the fundamental justice standard, a brief review of its genesis is
61
required.
In the period of political negotiation leading up to the drafting of
the Charter, the federal government proposed a "due process" guarantee for deprivations of "life, liberty, security of the person and the
enjoyment of property. '' 62 Yet the provincial governments, whose constitutional authority over "property and civil rights" would be most
affected by any such guarantee, were apprehensive of the potential
Lochnerization of the Charter. To allay concern that courts would
suddenly reverse their interpretation of identical language in section
1(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights and develop a theory of substantive
due process, the federal government abandoned the due process terminology.6 Moreover, Canada's socialist political party strongly opposed the inclusion of "the enjoyment of property" in the category of
guaranteed rights. That phrase was deleted as a result of fear that a
property guarantee could dismantle provincial and federal social welfare programmes, undermine trade unions, sterilize agricultural products marketing boards, and void land use regulation statutes. Much
of the current interest in section 7 flows directly from these two
political accommodations.

61. For a thorough discussion of the process, see Davenport, Reshaping Confederation:
The 19S2 Reform of the CanadianConstitution, 45 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1982,
at 1.
62. Canadian Bill of Rights, CAN. REV. STAT. app. III, § 1(a) (1970).
63. This political concern was surprising to commentators since the Supreme Court had
consistently taken a narrow view of the "due process" guarantee rendering it a purely procedural
standard meaning essentially no more than 'in accordance with existing law." See Curr v. The
Queen, 1972 S.C.R. 889; Miller v. The Queen, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680.
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Rediscovering Non-ProceduralDue Process

In the September 1980 draft of the Charter, the term "due process
of law" was replaced with the phrase "the principles of fundamental

justice." Several justifications were offered. First, Canadian lawyers
already knew the term "fundamental justice," because it had been
used in section 2(e) of the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights.6 Second, the

phrase was not politically charged. Officials in the federal Ministry of
Justice maintained that, unlike the expression "due process," the new
term clearly referred only to procedural standards.6 Third, the term
would discourage courts from relying too heavily on United States
jurisprudence, since all realized that the concept of due process had
often been deployed in curious ways simply to invoke federal jurisdiction.6 Finally, the term was preferred over the then predominant

procedural standard, natural justice. It would preempt the developing
imbroglio about whether natural justice and procedural fairness were
distinct standards, and whether only adjudications were reviewable
on due process grounds.
This borrowing of existing terminology did not, however, quiet
debate over the scope of section 7. Notwithstanding the obvious Parliamentary intent, counsel and commentators have tried to give the
section a substantive content. The arguments advanced track those
previously profferred in the United States and are well known6 Already more than twenty Superior Court decisions have dealt with

64. Canadian Bill of Rights, CAN. REV. STAT. app. III, § 2(e) (1970) provided that no law
of Canada was to be construed or applied so as to "deprive a person of his right to a fair hearing
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."
65. In evidence before the Parliamentary Commission, Barry Strayer (then Assistant Deputy Minister of Public Law in the Federal Department of Justice and now Mr. Justice Strayer
of the Federal Court of Appeal) stated:
[it] was our belief that the words "fundamental justice" would cover the same thing
as what is called procedural due process, that is the meaning of due process in
relation to requiring fair procedure. However, it in our view does not cover the
concept of what is called substantive due process, which would impose substantive
requirements as to the policy of the law in question ....
Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the
House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, No. 40 (Jan. 27, 1981) at 46:32, quoted in
Whyte, supra note 2, at 458.
66. Of course the need to assert a due process interest for the purpose of invoking federal
jurisdiction is unnecessary in Canada, which is possessed of a unitary federal court system. See
P. HOGG, supra note 2, at ch. 7.
67. For a brief review, see Mackay, supra note 2, at 295-300.
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claims to substantive due process under section 7.6 Three cases have
reached the Supreme Court docket, and in one, Reference Re Section
94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act [Section 94(2) Reference], a seven member
panel of the Court unanimously held that "the principles of fundamental
justice" have more than a purely procedural content.6 9
At issue in Section 94(2) Reference was whether the legislature of
British Columbia could make it an absolute liability regulatory offence,
punishable by a fine and minimum term of seven days imprisonment,
to drive with a suspended license. The Supreme Court concluded that
notwithstanding extrinsic evidence of Parliament's contrary intention,
"the principles of fundamental justice" are not limited solely to procedural guarantees, but "are to be found in the basic tenets and principles, not only of our judicial process, but also of the other components
of our legal system." 7 The Court then held that the mens rea require-

68. At least six cases expressly hold § 7 to be procedural only: Re Latham & Solicitor-Gen.
of Can., 12 C.C.C.3d 9 (Ont. C.A. 1983); Regina v. Hayden, 8 C.C.C.3d 33 (Man. C.A. 1983);
Re M.H. & the Queen (No. 2), 17 C.C.C.3d 443 (Alta. Q.B. 1985); Public Serv. Alliance v. The
Queen, 11 D.L.R.4th 337 (F.C.T.D. 1984); Re Balderstone & the Queen, 2 C.C.C.3d 37 (M.Q.B.
1982); Re Jamieson & the Queen, 70 C.C.C.2d 430 (Que. Sup. Ct. 1982). Another three suggest,
although do not hold, that § 7 is procedural. See Re United States & Smith, 10 C.C.C.3d 540
(Ont. C.A. 1984); Re Potma & the Queen, 2 C.C.C.3d 383 (Ont. C.A. 1983); Re Cadeddu & the
Queen, 4 C.C.C.3d 97 (Ont. H.C. 1982). By contrast, at least twelve cases can be read as giving
§ 7 a substantive interpretation. See Regina v. Swain, 53 O.R.2d 609 (C.A. 1986); Regina v.
Morgentaler, Smoling & Scott, 22 C.C.C.3d 353 (Ont. C.A. 1985); Re Howard & Sony Mountain
Inst., 19 C.C.C.3d 195 (Fed. C.A. 1985); Regina v. Robson, 19 C.C.C.3d 137 (B.C.C.A. 1985);
Regina v. Young, 13 C.C.C.3d 1 (Ont. C.A. 1984); Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor
Vehicle Act, 4 C.C.C.3d 243 (B.C.C.A. 1983); Regina v. Stevens, 3 C.C.C.3d 198 (Ont. C.A.
1983); The Queen v. Operation Dismantle, Inc., 3 D.L.R.4th 193 (F.C.A. 1983); Re Miller &
the Queen, 55 O.R.2d 417 (H.C.J. 1986); Re Rowland & the Queen, 13 C.C.C.3d 367 (Alta.
Q.B. 1984); R.L. Crain, Inc. v. Couture & Restrictive Trade Practices Comm'n, 6 D.L.R.4th
478 (Sask. Q.B. 1983); Regina v. G., 4 C.C.C.3d 466 (Ont. Co. Ct. 1982). Finally, in one case
§ 7 was held to be substantive only. Re Rolbin, [1982] 1 C.R.R. 186.
69. 24 D.L.R.4th 536 (S.C.C. 1985) (Lamer, J.) (McIntyre & Wilson, J.J., concurring
separately); see Regina v. Stevens (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court granted June 6, 1983,
but judgment not yet rendered). In Westendorp v. The Queen, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 43, 46, the
Court indirectly raised this issue, implying that § 7 was procedural only. Section 94(2) Reference
presumably can be taken as overruling Westendorp on this point.
70. Section 94(2) Refereiwe, 24 D.L.R.4th at 557. The gravamen of Justice Lamer's argument is that §§ 8-14, roughly a constitutional code of criminal procedure relating to search and
seizure, arrest and detention, criminal proceedings, punishment, and self-incrimination, deal
with substantive matters. It would be incongruous to read § 7, the general clause, more narrowly
than §§ 8-14, the specific guarantees. The Court also noted that the expression "fundamental
justice" in § 2(e) of the Bill of Rights was placed in the context of a right to a fair hearing,
while no such obvious procedural context is present in § 7. See id. at 547-50, 555-56.
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ment in criminal law was one such tenet. To the extent that conviction
for any absolute liability offence would lead to a deprivation of life,
liberty, or security of the person (that is, to the extent that imprisonment or even probation were a possible sanction), section 7 would be
violated and the legislative provision in question would be constitutionally impermissible.71

Significantly, the Supreme Court has scrupulously avoided substantive due process rhetoric and consistently refused to entertain arguments or offer reasons to suggest that substantive review of the wisdom or policy of legislation is possible. In several previous cases involving such diverse issues as the right to a hearing, the right to counsel,
reverse onus clauses, suppression of the defence of mistake of fact,
excessive delay in laying criminal charges, and the right not to self-incriminate, judges have been able to find either a purely procedural
basis under section 7 or a separate substantive Charter guarantee
upon which to review either police or administrative action. 72 In Section
94(2) Reference, the Court declined to hold that the principles of
fundamental justice encompass a substantive due process guarantee.73
One may deduce, therefore, two interconnected issues troubling the
Court. First, how to avoid incorporating the substantive due process/
procedural due process dichotomy into section 7; and second, how to
avoid conflating the concept of a purely procedural natural justice with
the concept of fundamental justice, or conversely, simply announcing
vague and indeterminate standards for deciding which principles of
law are principles of fundamental justice.-

71. Id. at 559-63. The Court also found that the Attorney-General for British Columbia had
not established the general § 1 exception to Charter rights. Id. at 563. The effect of § 1 is
discussed infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text. In a concurring judgment, Justice Wilson
denied that § 1 could save a breach of the principles of fundamental justice and found the
combination of absolute liability and mandatory imprisonment impermissible. Id. at 564-73.
72. See, e.g., Singh v. Minister of Employment & Immigration, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 7 (right to
hearing prior to deportation); Regina v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 (right to counsel prior to
giving breath sample); Trask v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 655 (same); Rahn v. The Queen,
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 659 (same); Regina v. Dubois, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 350 (scope of right against
self-incrimination).
73. See Section 94(2) Reference, 24 D.L.R.4th at 557. Justice Lamer wrote: "this is not to
say, however, that the principles of fundamental justice are limited solely to procedural guarantees." Id. at 577. Justice Wilson stated: "I have grave doubts that the dichotomy between
substance and procedure . . . should be imported into § 7 of the Charter." Id. at 571. Only
Justice McIntyre offered an affirmative statement: "I agree that fundamental justice, as the
term is used in the Charter, involves more than natural justice [which is largely procedural]
and includes as well as [sic] substantive element." Id. at 541.
74. See id. at 558. The best the Court could do is found in Justice Lamer's statement:
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B.

Finding Property in Life, Liberty, and Security of the Person

Fewer scholarly debates and judicial disagreements surround the
second modification to section 7 resulting from pre-enactment political
negotiation. The meaning of the phrase "life, liberty, and security of
the person" has not been extensively litigated outside the criminal law

field; nor have there been as many attempts indirectly to resurrect
the deleted term '"property" as a protected interest. In fact, courts
have often observed that, unlike natural justice, which applies to determinations affecting all manner of personal and property rights, the
fundamental justice guarantee attaches only to a limited class of personal rights.
Legislative provisions affecting the right to life in relation to
euthanasia, suicide, refusal of medical treatment, and capital punishment (the latter to all intents and purposes abolished in Canada since
1976) 7, have not been the subject of a Charter challenge. On the other
hand, parties on both sides of the abortion question have unsuccessfully
raised a section 7 argument. Courts have held that section 7 neither

prohibits abortions 76 nor guarantees the right to procure an abortion.7
Most litigation over the scope of the liberty guarantee has related
to criminal law, the paramount concern being the meaning of the
specific guarantees of sections 8 through 14.78 Nevertheless, section 7
retains an important role absent application of section 11(d), which
provides that "any person charged with an offence has the right...

"whether any given principle may be said to be a principle of fundamental justice within the
meaning of section 7 will rest upon an analysis of the nature, sources, rationale and essential
role of that principle within the judicial process and in our legal system, as it evolves." Id.; see
also id. at 571-73 (Justice Wilson seems to suggest that the implicit fundamental principle is
"punishment should not be disproportionate to the crime").
75. See Regina v. Miller & Cockriell, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680 (holding capital punishment not
cruel and unusual punishment under Canadian Bill of Rights).
76. See Borowski v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 4 D.L.R.4th 112 (Sask. Q.B. 1983) (fetus not
a "person" capable of bearing § 7 rights). This decision was confirmed by the Saskatchewan
Court of Appeal on a Judgment not yet reported. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada was granted in June, 1987.
77. See The Queen v. Morgentaler, 47 O.R.2d 353 (Ont. H.C.), affd 48 O.R.2d 519 (Ont.
C.A. 1984) (right to control reproduction not a protected liberty of a pregnant woman).
78. The fact that Criminal Law and Procedure is a federal head of power under the Constitution Act, 1867 contributes to a more rational structure of due process rights for accused persons.
Nevertheless, one may anticipate a series of analogous challenges to provincial statutes creating
regulatory offences. Already, as the annual index to the Canadian Rights Reporter testifies, §§
8-14 have been widely argued in quasi-criminal fields such as deportations, extradition, corrections, and parole.
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[to] . . . a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal." Section 7 should address statutes authorizing involuntary
civil commitments, quarantines for carriers of communicable diseases,
obligatory treatment for drug addiction and alcoholism, as well as the

entire corpus of immigration law. 79 A broader, socio-economic concept
of liberty has not yet been directly raised, probably because the most
innovative Charter claims have been argued under the affirmative
guarantee of security of the person 0°

Security of the person no doubt applies to any legislatively mandated interference with physical integrity, such as surgical intervention, organ transplants, blood transfusions, electroshock treatment,
lobotomies, compulsory extraction of bodily fluids, and sterilization. s1
In addition, litigants have argued that a degree of mental and social
well-being is a component of security of the person. In Operation
Dismantle v. The Queen, appellants argued that to permit the testing
of the cruise missile in Canada would increase the risk of nuclear war.
But the Supreme Court held that a Cabinet decision permitting the
testing did not infringe on the security of the person guarantee s2
Nevertheless, the Court left open the possibility that other non-phys-

ical infringements might be subject to Charter review.8 These could

79. See Singh v. Minister of Employment & Immigration, 17 D.L.R.4th 422 (S.C.C. 19&5)
(right of immigrant to determination of refugee status is right touching liberty and security of
the person, and requiring trial-type hearing); see also Mashaw, Dignitary Process: A Political
Psychology of Liberal Democratic Citizenship, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 433 (1987) ("State power
to punish, ostracize, or disable is always a serious threat to individual liberty.").
80. In other words, decisions on the scope of the liberty guarantee such as Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) would probably be argued in Canada under the security of
person guarantee. But see, e.g., P.S.A.C. v. The Queen, 11 D.L.R.4th 399 (F.C.T.D. 1984)
(right to liberty does not encompass freedom to contract).
81. An indication of the Supreme Court's likely approach to these issues can be seen in the
recent non-Charter case Re Eve, 31 D.L.R.4th 1 (1987). Upon an application by a mother to
have the court exercise its parens patriae jurisdiction, the court declined to authorize substituted
consent to non-therapeutic sterlization of a mentally retarded adult female. The Court held,
subsidiarily, that the right to procure a sterilization was not a protected § 7 right.
82. 18 D.L.R.4th 481 (S.C.C. 1984).
83. See Regina v. Therens, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613, 644 (Le Dain, J., dissenting). Justice Le
Dain intimated that security of the person should be understood as having both a physical and
psychological component. Id. The most interesting § 7 case yet reported is Litwack v.
National Parole Bd., [1986] 1 F.T.R. 282. Litwack involved a refusal to modify parole conditions
prohibiting petitioner from holding a position of trust. Justice Walsh held that the refusal
constituted an infringement of the right to security of the person (the right to earn a livelihood).
Thus the infringement was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. Id. at
288-90.
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conceivably include administrative permissions to pollute, to destroy
forests, or to dam rivers and streams; the granting of licenses to
transport hazardous materials; and decisions to redesign transportation
and energy corridors, or to site nuclear plants and prisons. 4
Many commentators remain preoccupied with strategies for surrepticiously reinserting property rights into section 7. Section 8's guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure has been unsuccessfully
used in attempts to overturn an expropriation,85 and to resist an administrative duces tecum order. 6 Both attempts represent classical
deployments of the "property" guarantee. Other litigants have argued
for a completely contrary view of property that would impose on
government a positive economic obligation. The expression "security
of the person" arguably includes an economic capacity to satisfy basic
human needs. On such a view, state action removing a person from
a welfare scheme, the confiscation of tools essential to one's work, the
refusal of a permit to practice a profession, the cancellation of a trade
license, or the refusal of public housing could constitute an infringement of section 7Y But no court has yet clearly reached such a conclusion, and on several occasions judges have explicitly denied that
section 7 can sustain a general protection of economic rights 5 On the

84. For an unsuccessful early attempt to raise such a question, see Re Town of Milton &
Ontario Waste Management Corp., 18 D.L.R.4th 688 (Ont. Div. Ct. 1984) (hazardous waste
dump siting).
85. See Re Becker, 148 D.L.R.3d 539 (Alta. C.A. 1983).
86. See Re Gershman Produce Co. & Motor Transp. Bd., 22 D.L.R.4th 520 (Man. C.A. 1985).
87. The argument has been put most forcefully by Whyte, supra note 2, at 474-75; see also
Re Mia & Medical Servs. Comm'n of B.C., 17 D.L.R.4th 385 (B.C.S.C. 1984) (denial of medicare
billing number); Re Workers' Compensation Bd. & Coastal Rental, 12 D.L.R.4th 564 (N.S.S.C.
1983) (government tax lien on third party property). In Re Fisherman's Wharf, 135 D.L.R.3d
307 (N.B.Q.B. 1982), the trial court held that § 7 reached property rights, but the court of
appeal affirmed this decision on other grounds sub nom. The Queen v. Estabrooks Pontiac
Buick, 144 D.L.R.3d 21 (N.B.C.A. 1982). See most recently Piercey v. General Bakeries Ltd.,
31 D.L.R.4th 373 (Nfld. S.C.T.D. 1986) (holding provincial labour legislation unconstitutional
as infringement of Charter).
88. The leading cases are: Elliott v. Director of Social Servs., 17 Man. R.2d 350 (C.A.
1982) (§ 7 inapplicable to withdrawal of welfare benefits); Manitoba Soc'y of Seniors, Inc. v.
Greater Winnipeg Gas Co., 18 Man. R.2d 440 (C.A. 1982) (§ 7 not available to require funding
expert witnesses); Re Gershman Produce Co. & Motor Transp. Bd., 22 D.L.R.4th 520 (Man.
C.A. 1985) (§ 7 does not apply to show cause hearing prior to license revocation); Re Groupe
d'eleveurs de volialles de 'est de l'Ontario, 14 D.L.R.4th 153 (F.C.T.D. 1984) (§ 7 not applicable
to product quotas). The contrast with the situation prevailing in the United States is striking.
In the United States, lawyers argue for novel forms of property (for example, Reich's "new
property") in order to get due process review. In Canada, lawyers argue that traditional forms
of property (for example, land and goods) are not property in order to get due process review.
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other hand, at least where federal legislation is in issue, litigants may
invoke the due process guarantee of the unrepealed and unconsolidated
1960 Canadian Bill of Rights to protect property rights.s A property
guarantee may well find expression in the Charter, but it will do so
only to the extent that "security of the person" is implicated. In such
a context, progressive income tax legislation, workers' compensation
laws, and environmental protection statutes will almost certainly survive non-procedural due process challenges.
C. The Scope and ProceduralContent of FundamentalJustice
In addition to questions of whether fundamental justice incorporates a theory of substantive due process, and whether it extends to
the protection of property, section 7 raises three general issues as to
its scope and content. 90 One of these, the constitutional impact of the
fundamental justice guarantee, is particularly complex. Section 1 of
the Charter gives explicit criteria to be applied in the balancing of
policy and principle, which the United States Supreme Court has
always avoided through formulae such as "political question," "executive privilege," and "no case or controversy." Moreover, section 33
permits a legislature to exclude the operation of parts of the Charter,
including section 7, by simple statute. The extent to which sections
1 and 33 de-constitutionalize the fundamental justice guarantee remains for many the Charter's unresolved paradox. For others, however, it is simply a continuing reflexion of Canadian constitutional
heterodoxy. 91

89. Compare Singh v. Minister of Employment & Immigration, 17 D.L.R.4th 422 (S.C.C.
1985) (suggesting that the Bill of Rights has constitutional status analogous to Charter) with Regina v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 18 D.L.R.4th 321 (S.C.C. 1985) (implying that the Bill of Rights

may be only a quasi-constitutional document not capable of grounding a judicial power to declare
legislation unconstitutional). It is also possible to deploy the equality guarantee of § 15 of the
Charter to protect property rights. See Re Fisherman's Wharf, 135 D.L.R.3d 307 (N.B.Q.B.
1982); Piercey v. General Bakeries Ltd., 31 D.L.R.4th 373 (Nfld. S.C.T.D. 1986).
90. The two most illuminating sources in respect of the issues canvassed here and in Part
V of this essay are D. GIBSON, supra note 2; CHARTER LITIGATION (R. Sharpe ed. 1986) (a
collection of essays reviewing litigation strategy and outcomes in connection with several Charter
guarantees).
91. Most scholarly commentary about the impact of the Charter has been focussed on § 33.
Some, however, perceive (in my view correctly) that the real issue is the relationship between
§ 33 and § 1. See, e.g., Slattery, CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms - Override Claims
Under Section 33 - Whether Subject to JudicialReview Under Section 1, 61 CAN. BAR REV.
391 (1983). After all, in both cases, courts are confronted with the perennial problem of deference
to legislative will, a problem they confront equally in natural justice litigation.
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A second foundational issue is whether the Charter applies only
to "state action." Despite some early commentary to the contrary,
most analysts today accept that section 7 should be confined to governmental and para-governmental activity.92 Section 32 provides that
the Charter applies to both Parliament and provincial legislatures,
and to bodies and individuals whose authority derives from them.
Courts have held that decisions of administrative agencies,
municipalities, and the Cabinet, whether authorized by statute or by

virtue of the Royal prerogative, will be subject to review. 93 But it is
uncertain whether section 7 reaches Crown corporations that are not
Crown agents, such as the C.B.C.; quasi-public authorities, such as
labour arbitrators and discipline committees; and domestic tribunals.Y
Some cases suggest that the Charter applies not only to judicial
proceedings, but also to judicial orders enforcing statutes and common
law rules, 95 and even to purely private action.9 But recently the Su-

92. The most eloquent spokesmen for a non-statist position are M. MANNING, RIGHTS,
255-56 (1983); Gibson, Distinguishing the Governors from the
Goveirned: The Meaning of "Government" Under Section 32(1) of the Charter, 13 MAN.L.J.
505 (1983). The narrower position is argued in P. HOGG, supra note 2, at 674-78; Swinton,
Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in CANADIAN CHARTER OF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS: COMMENTARY, supra note 2; see generally Christian, supra note 2;
McLellan & Elman, To Whom Does the Charter Apply? Some Recent Cases on Section 32, 24
ALTA. L. REV. 361 (1986); Slattery, Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Does It Bind Private
Persons?, 63 CAN. BAR REV. 148 (1985).
93. See Re Schmidt & the Queen, 4 C.C.C.3d 409 (Ont. H.C. 1983); McCutcheon v. City
of Toronto, 41 O.R.2d 652 (H.C. 1983); Hunter v. Southam, 11 D.L.R.4th 641 (S.C.C. 1984);
The Queen v. Operation Dismantle, Inc., 3 D.L.R.4th 193 (F.C.A. 1983); Van Mulligen v.
Saskatchewan Housing Corp., 23 Sask. R. 66 (Q.B. 1982).
94. Professor Hogg has suggested that the Charter would apply to a commercial corporation
that was an agent of the Crown. No court has yet adopted this view. On the other hand, there
is some weak authority that when a private decisionmaker has a legislative mandate, for example,
a labour arbitrator, the Charter will apply. By analogy, see Cat Prods. v. Macedo, [1985] 1
F.C. 269 (T.D.).
95. CompareRegina v. Begley, 38 O.R.2d 549 (H.C. 1982) (Charter not applicable to judicial
order banning publication of criminal proceedings prior to verdict) with Regina v. Germain, 53
A.R. 264 (Alta. Q.B. 1984) (Charter applicable to judicial contempt of court order).
96. Regina v. G.B., 3 W.W.R. 141 (Alta. Q.B. 1983); Regina v. Lerke, 13 C.C.C.3d 515
(Alta. Q.B. 1984). Of course, when private action is legislatively authorized, as in citizens arrests
or by-laws made by railways under the Railway Act, the Charter clearly will apply. Similarly,
when one private party invokes or relies upon governmental action in private litigation, a
Charter issue is raised. See Re Blainey & Ontario Minor Hockey Ass'n, 16 D.L.R.4th 728 (Ont.
C.A. 1986) (private action to compel registration of female hockey player in men's league successful on basis that league's defense of statutory authority unavailable when statute infringes
Charter).
FREEDOMS AND THE COURTS
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preme Court has taken a much narrower view of the Charter's reach. 97
In Retail Wholesale & DepartmentStore Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin
Delivery the Court was asked to decide whether a common law injunction to restrain secondary picketing offended the freedom of expression
guarantee of section 2(e). While the Court was prepared to find that
the Charter applied to rules of the common law, just as it would apply
to the Royal prerogative or to statutory rules, the Court would not
apply the Charter in the context of civil litigation between private
parties. Justice McIntyre concluded that, even though as decisionmakers, the courts were bound by the Charter, a judicial order per se
could not constitute "government action" within the meaning of section
32.98

A third issue courts must not confront is that of defining the scope
and the specific procedural guarantees of section 7. There has been
no indication that courts will have difficulty in extending the Charter
to all types of governmental functions. Like procedural fairness, and
unlike natural justice, the fundamental justice standard does not depend on a prior exercise of classification of functions. It may be invoked
in respect to adjudications, rule-making, investigations, recommendatory processes, contracting, and other types of informal administrative
action.9 Moreover, without exception commentators argue that courts

97. 33 D.L.R.4th 174 (S.C.C. 1987).
98. Id. at 196. Justice McIntyre stated:
While in political science terms it is probably acceptable to treat the courts as one
of the three fundamental branches of Government, that is, legislative, executive,
and judicial, I cannot equate for the purposes of Charter application the order of
a court with an element of governmental action. This is not to say that the courts
are not bound by the Charter. The courts are, of course, bound by the Charter
as they are bound by all law. It is their duty to apply the law, but in doing so
they act as neutral arbiters, not as contending parties involved in a dispute. To
regard a court order as an element of governmental intervention necessary to
invoke the Charter would, it seems to me, widen the scope of Charter application
to virtually all private litigation. All cases must end, if carried to completion, with
an enforcement order and if the Charter precludes the making of the order, where
a Charter right would be infringed, it would seem that all private litigation would
be subject to the Charter. In my view, this approach will not provide the answer
to the question. A more direct and a more precisely-defined connection between
the element of government action and the claim advanced must be present before
the Charter applies.
99. For representative cases not already mentioned, see Cadieux v. Director of Stony
Mountain Inst., 10 C.R.R. 248 (F.C.T.C. 1984); Re Cadeddu & The Queen, 4 C.C.C.3d 97 (Ont.
H.C. 1982); Re United States & Smith, 42 O.R.2d 668 (H.C. 1983); Willette v. Commissioner
of R.C.M.P., 10 Admin. L.R. 149 (F.C.A. 1984).
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should adopt a reasonably flexible approach as to what procedures the
principles of fundamental justice require in any given process. 1e One
may anticipate that courts will borrow both the rhetoric and substance
of procedural fairness decisions,01 although to date there are no examples of decisions where a non-adjudicative claim for due process has
been upheld or even raised. In any event, it is not yet clear whether
the fundamental justice standard, any more than the procedural fairness standard, will liberate due process from its adversarial adjudicative mould and lead to the invocation of alternative procedural mod-

els. 102
No court has explicitly addressed a final aspect of the content of
fundamental justice: whether "the principles of fundamental justice"
can be invoked to impose specific procedures even in cases where
Parliament or a legislature has enacted detailed codes governing administrative procedures. At common law, courts often were reticent
to imply a requirement of natural justice in the face of express statutory procedures. 0 3 However, since section 7 is an explicit rather than
an implied due process standard, such procedural codes will probably
no longer inhibit courts from requiring additional due process guarantees in individual cases.
After only five years of litigation, it is difficult to predict exactly
where the courts will take the section 7 guarantee. The fundamental
justice standard in the Charter is a product of the Anglo-Canadian
due process tradition. Yet in style and vocabulary it seems to reflect
United States preoccupations. For this reason, it has challenged both
Canadian procedural due process theorists versed in the presumptions
of the common law, and latter-day constitutional scholars. A direct
comparison of these two due process guarantees is therefore appropriate.

100. See Freedoms, supra note 2, at 278-85; Mackay, supra note 2, passim.
101. The leading cases on the new rhetoric of procedural fairness are M.N.R. v. Coopers
& Lybrand, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 495; Martineau v. Matsqui Inst. Disciplinary Bd. (No. 2), [1980] 1
S.C.R. 602; Attorney Gen. of Can. v. Inuit Tapirisat, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735.
102. For an attempt to illustrate how courts might respond to such an opportunity, see
Macdonald, A Theory of ProceduralFairness, 1 WINDSOR. Y.B. AccEss. JUST. 3 (1981).
103. See Macdonald, supra note 22, at 550-63 (assessment of position at common law). The
argument for deference usually is as follows. Natural justice, on one view at least, is implied
only to supply the omission of the legislature. Therefore, if the legislature has provided a detailed
statutory code, it cannot be said to have inadvertently omitted to consider procedural matters.

Hence, the presumption of natural justice ought not to apply.
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THE INTERACTION OF THE NATURAL JUSTICE AND
THE FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE STANDARDS

Almost all section 7 commentators have speculated, at least in
general terms, upon the interaction between the common law natural
justice standard and the Charter fundamental justice standard.104 Surprisingly few, however, have attempted to situate the two standards
in their broader constitutional context, and to develop the connexion
between their content and their means of enforcement. As noted already, the natural justice standard has been applied to domestic tribunals and to private action to a far greater extent than apparently the
courts will assert the fundamental justice standard. By contrast, there
is some evidence that within the framework of traditional government
action, section 7 may have a broader reach. The Charter standard
might apply not only to administrative agencies, inferior courts, the
Cabinet, and other statutory, prerogative, or contractual power-holders, but possibly also to proceedings of the Superior Courts and the
processes of Parliament itself.105 Common law courts have been somewhat reluctant to extend the fairness doctrine to certain types of
legislative, rule-making, contracting, and negotiating activity, and to
develop procedural models against which due process claims in each
of these domains can be evaluated, but they appear to feel less reticence about section 7. Whereas the natural justice and procedural
fairness standards applied equally to personal and economic rights,
the omission of a property guarantee from section 7 will compel an
as yet undisclosed judicial inventiveness to achieve the same substantive reach. Finally, it seems that the concept of fundamental justice
has not added a new procedural due process standard to Canadian
law. That is, while section 7 may indeed have a substantive or quasi-

104. See sources cited supra note 2.
105. At common law, the hallmark of a Superior Court was that it exercised the supervisory
power and itself could err as to jurisdiction free from collateral attack upon its decisions by any
other tribunal. Hence, natural justice could not be invoked as against judicial proceedings of a
Superior Court. Today, if a judge hearing a case involving the government were to breach a
Charter guarantee (for example, if he were to take a bribe or were to decide without hearing),
his decision presumably could be collaterally attacked before another Superior Court justice.
As to Parliament, it is difficult although not impossible to conceive of how a Charter challenge
might be brought against any parliamentary proceedings. A joint address for removal of a
Superior Court judge or an order of expulsion rendered by the Speaker of the House are two
examples that come to mind. Procedures before Commons Committees would, as in the United
States, attract the Charter. There is as yet, however, no evidence as to what procedural content
courts will require in these latter cases.
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substantive content not associated with natural justice since the seventeenth century, the purely procedural content of fundamental justice
is apparently identical to that of modern day natural justice and procedural fairness.'10
A.

Standing, Judicial Jurisdiction, and Remedies

Other points of comparison reveal important theoretical differences
and the reciprocal influence between these standards. To commence,
it is worth contrasting the two standards from the perspective of civil
procedure.
Standing, of course, is the threshold issue.1? At common law, a
breach of the rules of natural justice usually was challenged by writ
of certiorari or by an action for a declaration. The 1970s and 1980s
saw the Supreme Court considerably liberalize the law of standing
with respect to constitutional claims,'08 but until recently the spill-over
effect upon administrative law remedies has been less certain.' °9 Conventionally, an ordinary action brought under section 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 to have a statute declared ultra vires section 7
would attract the liberalized standing criteria applicable to other constitutional claims, n° as would a section 7 challenge to specific administrative action brought under section 24.111 But now, perhaps as a direct

106.

What is more, even though the specific provisions of §§ 8-14 of the Charter may

establish constitutional procedural guarantees not found in the natural justice standard or in
existing rules of criminal procedure, in general courts do not seem to have used this explicit
legislative invitation to give any additional content to the procedural guarantees mandated by
§ 7. See Mackay, supra note 2, at 326. But see Re Howard & Stony Mountain Inst., 19 C.C.C.3d
195 (Fed. C.A. 1985) (exceptional case in which court attempted to establish § 7 as an "enhancer"
of common law procedural fairness).
107. See generally D. GIBSON, supra note 2, at 264-78; CHARTER LITIGATION, supra note
90, pt. I.
108. See Thorson v. Attorney Gen. of Can., 43 D.L.R.3d 1 (S.C.C. 1974); Nova Scotia Bd.
of Censors v. McNeil, 55 D.L.R.3d 632 (S.C.C. 1975); Borowski v. Attorney Gen. of Can.,
(1981] 2 S.C.R. 575.
109. For certiorari, standing to persons not directly aggrieved or forming a part of a
specially affected class usually has been refused. See Re North Vancouver & Natl Harbours
Bd., 89 D.L.R.3d 704 (F.C.T.D. 1978). The result is mixed as to declarations. Compare Re
Clark & Attorney Gen. of Can., 81 D.L.R.3d 33 (Ont. H.C. 1977) (applying McNeil, 55 D.L.R.3d
at 632, in non-constitutional setting) with Rosenberg v. Grand River Conservation Auth., 12
O.R.2d 496 (C.A. 1975) (McNeil, 55 D.L.R.3d at 632, has no application to non-constitutional
cases).
110. See Re Edmonton Journal & Attorney Gen. Alta., 4 C.C.C.3d 59 (Alta. Q.B. 1983)
for a recent example.
111. Section 24(1) provides: "Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this
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result of the change in judicial posture stimulated by the Charter,
courts have claimed discretion to grant "public interest standing" to
private parties who challenge, even on non-constitutional grounds,
various exercises of statutory authority. 112 If this trend continues there
might soon be no discernible difference in standing requirements to
bring Charter or non-Charter procedural due process claims.
Judicial jurisdiction over due process claims constitutes another
fruitful point of comparison."1 Direct review for breach of the rules
of natural justice was historically vested exclusively in the Superior
Courts, being an aspect of the supervisory jurisdiction. A similar principle ought to apply to declaratory proceedings under section 52. Of
course, if a natural justice or Charter issue were properly raised in
a proceeding before an inferior court that had jurisdiction over the
substance of a given dispute, that due process claim could be pursued." 4 The special remedy of section 24, however, is properly brought
before any court of competent jurisdiction. While there is some doubt
about whether this requirement permits administrative appeal tribunals to grant in rem orders to quash decisions taken in violation of a
section 7 right, courts of inferior jurisdiction might well be allowed
to exercise such a power. 115
At common law, breaches of natural justice typically were
sanctioned by the issue of a writ of certiorari or prohibition, while
procedural fairness was raised in declaratory or injunctive proceedings.
Apart from these traditional recourses, section 24 permits a court
hearing a Charter claim to award "such remedy as [it] considers just
in the circumstances." To date courts have concluded that section 24
does not vest new remedial powers in inferior courts or administrative

Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain
such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances." Two cases in
particular reveal a liberal attitude to standing questions under § 24(1). See Singh v. Minister
of Employment & Immigration, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 7 (simple fear of reprisal in one's country of
origin deemed sufficient to ground standing in a refugee case); Quebec Ass'n of Protestant
School Bds. v. Attorney Gen. of Que., 140 D.L.R.3d 33 (Que. S.C. 1982) (court permitted a §
24(1) application to proceed, notwithstanding that the infringement claimed would be a future
and uncertain event).
112. See, notably, Minister of Fin. v. Finlay, 33 D.L.R.4th 321 (S.C.C. 1987).
113. See D. GIBSON, supra note 2, at 279-87; Smith, Applying the Charter,in CHARTER
OF RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1 (G. Smith ed. 1983).
114. On the general principles governing both collateral attack and private law actions (for
example, damages, specific performance, restitution) grounded in an alleged procedural defect
in a previous proceeding, see D. MULLAN, supra note 41, at 217-21.
115. See P. HOGG, supra note 2, at 695-97 (a general discussion of judicial jurisdiction).
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appeal tribunals even if either has jurisdiction over a section 7 claim.
Hence, if "the court of competent jurisdiction" is not a Superior Court
the power to fashion novel orders and recourses is severely constrained." 6 Moreover, the prophylactic value of section 24, even in
proceedings before a Superior Court, is limited because a separate
application for a section 24 remedy has been held not to be timely
until the court or tribunal initially seized with a matter has decided
upon the alleged Charter infringement. 117 Thus, unlike the common
law remedy of prohibition, available to enjoin proceedings being taken
or even threatened in breach of natural justice, section 24 has a limited
preventive dimension.
Nevertheless, the type of remedial orders that may be issued under
section 24 are quite diverse, and include not only traditional defensive
remedies," 8 but also offensive remedies such as mandatory injunctions,
and damages for constitutional torts. Also possible are novel structural
remedies such as appointing counsel, ordering a jury trial, or imposing
a particular administrative procedure." 9 Surprisingly, courts have not
yet taken advantage of the opportunities provided by the last clause
of section 24(1).
B.

ConstitutionalStatus and Judicial Deference

The natural justice and fundamental justice standards may also be
compared in relation to their constitutional status. Natural justice is
a common law constitutional presumption. As such it may be ousted
by express legislative language, by a properly structured discretionary
grant of substantive jurisdiction, and possibly even by implication
from a detailed legislative procedural code.2 0 Moreover, since natural

116. See Re Seaway Trust, 41 O.R.2d 532 (Ont. C.A. 1983); Singh v. Minister of Employment
& Immigration, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 7.
117. See Re Krakowski & The Queen, 41 O.R.2d 321 (Ont. C.A. 1983).
118. Typical defensive recourses are the declaration of a nullity, the staying of proceedings,
injunctions, and the exclusion of evidence, the latter specifically authorized under § 24(2). See
Regina v. Vermette, 3 C.C.C.3d 38 (Que. C.A. 1982).
119. See D. GIBSON, supra note 2, at 183-215; MacLellan & Elman, The Enforcement of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An Analysis of Section 24, 21 ALTA. L. REV.
205 (1983); Pilldngton, Damages as a Remedy for Infringement of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, 62 CAN. BAR REV. 517 (1984). To date, however, the cases have been
disappointing. See Regina v. Lyons (No. 2), 141 D.L.R.3d 376 (B.C.C.A. 1982) (refusal to
appoint counsel); Regina v. Crate, 1 D.L.R.4th 149 (Alta. C.A. 1983) (refusal to order jury trial).
120. See Regina v. Randolph, 1966 S.C.R. 260 (exclusion by express language); Roper v.
Royal Victoria Hosp., 50 D.L.R.3d 725 (S.C.C. 1974) (discretion as to holding hearing and as
to procedures ousts due process). But see Crevier v. Attorney Gen. for Que., [1981] 2 S.C.R.
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justice is a presumption, in the past courts have been prepared to
refuse relief on the grounds that the requirements of natural justice
have been waived, or that no substantial injustice has resulted from
its breach. Inevitably, therefore, due process review for breach of the
rules of natural justice starkly raises the issue of judicial deference
to Parliamentary will. It follows that the key issue in any common
law proceeding is the extent to which courts are willing to concede
that the legislature has spoken clearly about questions of procedure. 121
The identical issue of judicial deference arises, albeit in a slightly
different form, in proceedings under section 7 of the Charter. Accept-

ing that the Charter is a legislative rather than a common law constitutional standard, its specific section 7 guarantee, nevertheless, may be
legislatively overridden. Section 33 permits Parliament or a legislature
to preclude the operation of sections 2 and 7 through 15 of the Charter
for infinitely renewable periods of up to five years each. 1 2 The section
33 override, with one exception, has only been invoked in Quebec, but
in that province it has been systematically deployed.1m Recently the
Quebec Court of Appeal held that the retroactive insertion of the
override into all Quebec statutes by means of a single general amending
statute did not meet the manner and form requirements for the invocation of section 33.124 The impact of this judgment on as yet hypothet-

220 (privative clause not effective to preclude jurisdictional review of orders of a provincial
tribunal).
121. The dynamic of this judicial "concession" is explored in Perspective, supra note 30, at
205-21.
122. To all intents and purposes, therefore, a legislature may dispose of the fundamental
justice standard exactly as it would overcome the natural justice standard. Sections 52 & 33 of
the Charter merely require that certain "manner and form" requirements for excluding the
fundamental justice standard be followed. Paradoxically, the use of § 33 to override § 7 does
not per se preclude recourse to the natural justice standard. In order to also exclude the natural
justice standard it would be necessary to adopt one of the legislative techniques noted supra
note 120 and accompanying text.
123. Immediately after the Charter was proclaimed in force, the National Assembly of
Quebec enacted Bill 62, An Act Respecting the Constitution Act, 1982, 1982 Que. Stat. ch. 21,
which retroactively inserted the override into all existing Quebec statutes. Thereafter, each
new act also contained the override.
The one exception is SGEU Dispute Settlement Act, 1984-1986 Sask. Stat. ch. 111, § 9(1)
1173. This provision inserted an override into an act ordering public servants to stop rotating
strikes.
124. See Alliance des professuers de Montreal v. Attorney Gen. for Que., 21 D.L.R.4th
354 (Que. C.A. 1985) (leave to appeal to the Supreme Court granted September 30, 1985). The
Qudbec Court of Appeal seemed to suggest that the override would have to be inserted individually in each statute and would have to explicitly identify which Charter guarantees were being
overridden.
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ical future section 33 jurisprudence is difficult to foresee. However,
given that the Court accepted the authority of the Quebec National
Assembly to deploy section 33 and contested only the mechanism it
chose, a properly crafted general override might well be unassailable. -5
When section 33 is not deployed to override section 7, the residual
question addressed explicitly in section 1 poses in a legislative rather
than a common law formulation the same issue of judicial deference
that arises in judicial review proceedings for breach of the rules of
natural justice. Again, only the way the question is framed varies. If
natural justice is the claim, the issue is whether courts should interpret
statutes so as to imply procedural due process standards that "supply
the omission of the legislature." If fundamental justice is the claim,
the issue is both whether the court should "supply the omission of
the legislature" when a statute is silent on procedural questions, and
whether the court should defer to the "commission of the legislature"
when a statute expressly imposes procedural norms. 126
Section 1, which provides that the rights guaranteed by the Charter
are "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society," has been
extensively litigated. 12 In fact, given the Supreme Court's view that

125. In the face of a general override that meets the manner and form requirements of
Alliance des professeurs, 21 D.L.R.4th at 354, few strategies to contest the use of § 33 are
open. Presumably, one would be obliged either to say that the deployment of § 33 is contingent
upon meeting the § 1 reasonableness test, an argument apparently rejected, id. at 362, or to
argue that the statute invoking the override is subject to some implied standard of legality
derivable either from § 7 or from the Charter's preamble. On the first argument, see Slattery,
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Override Claims Under Section 33 - Whether
Subject to Judicial Review Under Section 1, 61 CAN. BAR REV. 391 (1983). For an argument
that § 7 limits the manner in which § 33 may be deployed, see Arbess, Limitations on Legislative
Override under the CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms: A Matter of Balancing Values,
21 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 113 (1983). For a case in which the Supreme Court actually relied on
a process of reasoning analogous to that offered as a second strategy, see Re Manitoba Language
Reference, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 (notwithstanding invalidity of all statutes passed in Manitoba
from 1890-1984, court invokes principle of Rule of Law to preserve civil government until void
statutes properly translated and re-enacted).
126. For a thoughtful discussion of these issues, see Judicial Deference, supra note 2.
127. For a general analysis, see T. Christian, The Limited Operation of the Limitations
Clause, 25 ALTA. L. REV. 264 (1987) and D. GIBSON, supra note 2, at 133-62. The Supreme

Court has directly considered § 1 on several occasions. The decisions containing the most extensive discussion of the section are Regina v. Oakes, 26 D.L.R.4th 200 (S.C.C. 1986); Edwards
Books & Art Ltd. v. The Queen, 35 D.L.R.4th 1 (S.C.C. 1987); Singh v. Minister of Employment
& Immigration, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 7; Regina v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 18 D.L.R.4th 321 (S.C.C.
1985); Hunter v. Southam, 11 D.L.R.4th 641 (S.C.C. 1984); Law Soc'y Upper Can. v. Skapinker,
9 D.L.R.4th 161 (S.C.C. 1984); Jones v. The Queen, 31 D.L.R.4th 569 (S.C.C. 1987).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 1

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

section 1 operates after an infringement of a Charter right has been
found, as a contingent limitation on such a right, this issue necessarily
arises in every case. The Court has wavered on the evidentiary burden
section 1 imposes in respect of general Charter litigation. 12 But the
interaction of section 1 and section 7 raises special problems. Section
94(2) Reference suggested two different approaches. Adopting the
analysis taken in other section 1 cases, Justice Lamer's majority opinion held that section 1 could be invoked to save an enactment or
procedure that otherwise offended the principles of fundamental justice. 129 Justice Wilson, by contrast, held that if a section 7 right has
been impaired without regard to the principles of fundamental justice,
section 1 cannot then be invoked to save the enactment. Rather,

section 1 operates to impose a further justificatory burden upon the
government if a section 7 right has been infringed in accordancewith
the principles of fundamental justice. 13 It remains an open question
whether the section 7 guarantee is like any other Charter right, as
Justice Lamer asserts, or whether it also amounts to a positive assertion of a guaranteed right whose permissible limitations are self-defined, as Justice Wilson believes.

128. In Regina v. Oakes, 26 D.L.R.4th 200 (S.C.C. 1986), a case involving a reverse onus
clause in a narcotics control statute, the Court advanced a twofold test that, in effect, has
four components: the objective of the legislation under attack must be of sufficient importance
to warrant the infringement of a Charter right; the measures must be carefully designed to
meet that objective; they must involve as minimal impairment of the Charter right as possible;
and actual effects of the measures must be proportional to the objective to be achieved. Such
a test puts a heavy evidentiary burden on governments seeking to plead § 1. But in Edwards
Books & Art Ltd. v. The Queen, 35 D.L.R.4th 1 (S.C.C. 1987), a case involving a Sunday-closing
statute, the court, on the facts, found no disproportionality, in a judgment surprising to many.
Finally, in Jones v. The Queen, 31 D.L.R.4th 569 (S.C.C. 1987), the Court seemed to retreat
from its earlier jurisprudence on the burden of proof question. Justice Laforest stated that the
Crown assumes a burden of proof only
[w]here evidence is required in order to prove the constituent elements of a § 1
inquiry. I do not think such evidence is required here. A court must be taken to
have a general knowledge of our history and values and to know at least the broad
design and workings of our society. We are not concerned with particular facts.
Id. at 594.
129. See Section 94(2) Reference, 24 D.L.R.4th at 563.
130. See id. at 565. For support of Justice Wilson's view, see Bender, The CanadianCharter
of Rights and Freedoms and the United States Bill of Rights: A Comparison, 28 MCGILL L.J.
811 (1983) (arguing that all Charter guarantees containing their own limitations, for example,
§ 7, or § 8, which prohibits unreasonablesearch and seizure, cannot be further limited by a §
1 argument). To date lower courts have twice adopted the Bender thesis. See Re Moore & The
Queen, 45 O.R.2d 3 (H.C. 1984) (concerning § 12); Re Reich & Alberta College of Physicians,
8 D.L.R.4th 696 (Alta. Q.B. 1984).
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The Supreme Court is undoubtedly attempting to work out a theory
of section 1 that falls between the extremes advanced in doctrinal
commentary. For example, some claim that section 1 requires minimal
judicial deference to legislative will: Charter rights always trump social
policies.131 Others advocate a more deferential approach out of fear
that a judicial due process rampage will stimulate excessive recourse
to section 33 with the result that social policy will always trump
Charter rights.1 Still others suggest that section 1 is not the second
step of an inquiry into the scope of a Charter right. Rather, they
claim that section 1 is an explicit codification of the issue the United
States Supreme Court faces in developing doctrines such as "clear and
present danger" or "political question." Section 1 simultaneously indicates when Charter rights trump social policy, directs the court to
the applicable test, and structures the balancing to be undertaken. In
this sense it preserves the ideological heterodoxy of Canadian political
and legal culture.13 The Supreme Court has proceeded cautiously,
avoiding any language such as "strict scrutiny" jargon that would
colour the debate, and continuing to rely on a general "reasonableness"
standard in dealing with both natural justice and section 7 due process
claims. ' 3
C. The Political Theory Underlying FundamentalJustice
A final major issue implied by the co-existence of common law and
legislative due process standards is the post-Charter relationship of
common law constitutional doctrines and the guarantees of the Char-

131. See Roman, The Possible Impact of the CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms
on Administrative Law, 26 C. DE D. 339, 358 (1985).
132. This is an argument often made by administrative law specialists who are familiar
with previous legislative reactions to judicial zeal. Examples in point would be recourse to
privative clauses as a response to the rediscovery of error of law on the face of the record,
recourse to subjective grants of power in response to novel abuse of discretion doctrines, and
recourse to more detailed procedural codes in response to the fairness doctrine. See Judicial
Deference, supra note 2, for a discussion of the waxing and waning of judicial scrutiny.
133. For a lengthy development of this theme, see Monahan, Judicial Review and Democracy: A Theory of Judicial Review, 21 U.B.C.L. REV. 87 (1987). A more comprehensive
statement of Monahan's position may be found in his recent book, P. MONAHAN, POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION:

THE CHARTER,

FEDERALISM AND THE SUPREME

COURT OF

CANADA (1987).

134. See Mackay, supra note 2, at 331-35; Morissette, supra note 60; Tremblay, supra note
2; see also MacLauchlan, JudicialReview of Administrative Interpretationsof Law: How Much
Formalism Can We Reasonably Bear?, 36 U. TORONTO L.J. 343, 374-85 (1986) (especially
recommended analysis).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1987

45

Florida OF
Law
Review,LAW
Vol.REVIEW
39, Iss. 2 [1987], Art. 1
FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY

(Vol. 39

ter. A useful starting point for assessing this question is the Preamble
to the Charter. The preamble states, "Whereas Canada is founded
upon principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of
law .

. . ."

The preamble, together with section 26, which provides,

in a fashion similar to the ninth amendment, 135 that common law rights
continue to subsist notwithstanding their omission or partial omission
from the Charter, means that the Charter is not prior to the common
law, but continues to be a reflexion of it. 136 Thus the Charter does

not impliedly repeal the Canadian Bill of Rights 37 or common law due
process guarantees. 138
Unquestionably, the natural justice standard was merely one of a
series of common law presumptions; as such, it had only a limited
generative capacity as a due process norm. The fundamental justice
standard does not automatically lend itself to a similar conclusion.- 39
For example, section 7 may well embody the common law presumptions canvassed earlier. Of course, the deletion of an affirmative
guarantee to the enjoyment of property weakens the case for incorporation of the "no expropriation without compensation" presumption.
Nevertheless, presumptions relating, inter alia, to access to the courts,
private clauses, mens rea, the scope of delegated legislative, the maxim

135. Note that § 26 does not "reserve these to the provinces"; rather, the Crown continues
to claim these on behalf of the people.
136. In other words, the Charter, like the principle of legislative supremacy, is a product
of the common law and is circumscribed by the common law constitution.
137. The precise interrelation of the Charter and the Bill of Rights is beyond the scope of
this article. But, to the extent the Bill of Rights is now being resurrected as a quasi-constitutional
document and not merely as an interpretive instrument, see cases cited supra note 89, then
guarantees in the Bill of Rights relating, inter alia, to the right of property will have constitutional
effect. In this sense, at least in federal matters (the Bill of Rights not applying to the provinces),
there are two written procedural guarantees: the fundamental justice standard of § 7 of the
Charter as it relates to "life, liberty, and security of the person," and the due process of law
standard of § 1(a) of the Bill of Rights as it relates to "life, liberty, security of the person, and
enjoyment of property."
138. Of course, the question then becomes what are these common law guarantees. To date
courts have been uncertain just how much of the private law is constitutionally protected. For
example, in The Queen in Right of N.B. v. Fisherman's Wharf Ltd., 135 D.L.R.3d 307 (N.B.Q.B.
1982), the court held that the right to enjoy property free from the threat of confiscation was
a § 26 right. By contrast, in Re Groupe des 6leveurs de volailles de Vest de l'Ontario, 14
D.L.R.4th 151 (F.C.T.D. 1984), the principle of strict construction of statutes interfering with
freedom of contract was held not to be a § 26 right. Again, by contrast, in Re Piercey v. General
Bakeries Ltd., 31 D.L.R.4th 373 (Nfld. S.C.T.D. 1986), the court seemed to suggest that
"fault-based liability" was a guaranteed right.
139. Of course, natural justice was broader in scope, in that it also covered the right of
property.
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delegatus non potest delegare, the theory of agency jurisdiction, and
exposure of public officials to tort liability, can readily be seen as
"basic tenets and principles" of Canada's constitutional tradition. 140
A more difficult question concerns the relationship between section
7 and the concept of an implied Bill of Rights. The incorporation of
various common law presumptions into section 7 is not inconsistent
with their survival under section 26. Depending on how the court
interprets their importance in relation to life, liberty, and security of
the person, they may or may not achieve section 33 reinforcement.
But the same cannot be true of those ideals reflected in the notion of
an implied Bill of Rights. Most such ideals cannot be made to fit the
section 7 test. Unless the expression "Rule of Law" in the preamble
to the Charter can be read as bootstrapping, through section 26,
Canada's entire common law constitutional tradition into the Charter,141
the scope for pleading an implied Bill of Rights in a due process
context is next to nil. On the other hand, when constitutional government itself is threatened, courts have shown a willingness to give the
"Rule of Law" a substantive content. 142 This may well be the only
avenue for protecting due process values against systematic assault
through the section 33 override.
These observations about the interaction of the natural justice and
fundamental justice standards should conclude with a discussion of
"pragmatics" of the two standards. The Charter raises more directly
the perennial debate about whether due process has a non-procedural
content. At common law, the plethora of other doctrines under which
the merits of administrative decisions could be reviewed meant that
substantive issues were present only peripherally in natural justice
litigation. Since fundamental justice appears to be the only Charter
guarantee capable of incorporating these complementary review doctrines, this issue has emerged as central to the meaning of section 7.
Of course, the Supreme Court has already opened the door to folding

140. While other common law doctrines such as the notions of private property per se,
freedom of contract, freedom of willing, fault-based liability, and parental authority over their

children not having reached the age of majority may well be § 26 rights, they do not fall under
the fundamental justice guarantee. Only common law constitutional doctrines touching state
action may become Charter rights under § 7.
141. This is a highly unlikely possibility since the preamble contains no affirmative statement
and since section 26 does not transform these common law guarantees into Charter rights.
142. See cases cited supra notes 14 & 26. For a skeptical assessment of this jurisprudence,
see D. GIBSON,supra note 2, at 1-12, who takes a position diametrically opposed to that argued

here.
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the entire theory of agency jurisdiction into the fundamental justice
standard. But the delicate judicial craftsmanship necessary to assert
control over agency vires at the point of legislative enactment without
embarking on the road to Lochner v. New York 43 has not yet been
made explicit. For this reason the deletion of property as a protected
right dovetails perfectly with the expansive conception of fundamental
justice adopted by the Supreme Court.'"
The Charter has destabilized both the rhetoric and the political
theory of procedural due process. At common law, a heterodox political
ideology coupled with acknowledgement of Parliamentary sovereignty
helped insulate courts from libertarian pressures to "right all wrongs";
but almost all early commentators have claimed that the legal liberal
model of law and state underlies the Charter. To summarize, the
dilemma of section 7 lies precisely in its difference from common law
due process. As a common law principle, natural justice necessarily
required its own justification. Thus, it was invoked more cautiously,
but, once invoked, respected more universally by Parliament. Courts
and legislatures engaged in a genuine dialectic. As a legislated standard, fundamental justice does not necessarily require its own justification. Courts may well be tempted, in consequence, to treat it as fiat.
In the final analysis, reconciling the "donn." and the "construit" is
the crucial issue now confronting Canadian constitutional theorists.',
VI.

CONCLUSION

The preceding sections give a fair account of the Canadian political
and legal traditions, the evolution of the procedural due process
guarantees of natural justice and fundamental justice, and the interaction of these two standards in contemporary constitutional law. The
general patterns traced are not unknown to other liberal democracies.
But there are also unique aspects of the Canadian experience that

143.
144.

198 U.S. 45 (1905).
It is one thing to declare agency action ultra vires a generic statute on substantive

grounds. It is another to find substantive principles that preclude legislatures from crafting
statutes to establish a given social programme such as no-fault automobile insurance, no-fault
workers' compensation insurance, agricultural marketing schemes, and so on. The challenge of
§ 7, therefore, is to remain faithful to the common law constitution without reimposing a
substantive guarantee of the liberal right to property.
145. These terms are from F. GENY, METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES DE
DROIT PRIVE POSITIF (1899). The best English language analyses I have found of these problems
are those of Lon Fuller. See L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 43-84 (1968); Fuller, Reason
and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARv. L. REV. 376 (1946).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol39/iss2/1

48

Macdonald:CANADLIN
ProceduralCONSTITUTIONAL
Due Process in Canadian
Constitutional Law: Natural Ju
LAW

merit further attention in this conclusion, if only to bring into sharper
focus some of the tacit presumptions of modern American due process
theory.
It is appropriate to consider first the exact nature of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms as a constitutional document. Although largely
inspired by the American Bill of Rights, the Charter is more than a
pale reflection of any existing document. It reveals several very Canadian preoccupations: (i) the preamble juxtaposes the Supremacy of
God and the Rule of Law as foundational principles of the Canadian
polity; (ii) the Charter explicitly subjects the rights it guarantees to
such reasonable limits as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society; (iii) a number of political rights, variously labelled
democratic rights and mobility rights, are entrenched, although a right
to the enjoyment of property is not; (iv) notwithstanding a formal
guarantee of equality, multiculturalism is preserved and affirmative
action programmes are specifically permitted; (v) freedom of religion
co-exists with a constitutional guarantee of state-subsidized denominational schools; and (vi) legislatures may override by ordinary statute
several of the guaranteed rights enumerated in the Charter.
The careful reader will note that each of these features reflects a
particular non-liberal democratic aspect of the Canadian political and
constitutional heritage. The sectarian preamble, denominational
schools, and multiculturalism are consistent with a Tory (and ultramontaine) view of society. The failure to include the enjoyment of
property as a protected right in section 7, the promotion of equality
of condition through affirmative action, and the legislative override
suggest socialist preoccupations. The enumeration of fundamental freedoms, democratic rights, mobility rights, equality rights, and language
rights alongside traditional legal rights flows from a continuing commitment to the special version of the separation of law and politics implicit
in Canada's common law constitution inherited from the United Kingdom. In other words, the specific terms of the Charter itself imply
the same ideological heterodoxy found in other Canadian legal artifacts.
Already the Supreme Court has been required to address several
of these features in deciding Charter cases. A number of motifs turn
up in its early work. First, the Court has already rejected its own
legalistic Canadian Bill of Rights jurisprudence: it has consistently
pursued a generous interpretive strategy more in keeping with the
methodology of the common law. That is, the Court recognizes that
the Charter is not grounded in a commitment to "freedom as the
absence of constraint." Second, the Court wisely has not yet addressed
the legitimacy issue that has vexed Americans: it has skirted the
question by stating simply that section 52 preempts discussion of its
legal power to strike down statutes. That is, the Court acknowledges
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that its moral authority to assert its legal authority as set out in the
Charter cannot be proclaimed but must be freely accorded by citizens.
Third, the Court has argued that the standards now contained in the
Charter may be applied with the same degree of objectivity as earlier
common law standards. It has made a concerted effort to weave the
Charter into Canada's existing constitutional arrangements. That is,
the Court accepts that the ultimate authority of the Charter flows
from common law constitutional principles.
Most observers have not fully appreciated the subtlety of the
Court's emergent position on these questions. Their pre-Charter adoration of or hostility to the ideology of liberal legalism, and the conception
of the minimal state that it implies, has simply been reiterated in
much post-Charter commentary. 146 Notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's explicit invitation to the contrary, the Charter has been read
as a document that exclusively defines the constitutional processes of
the Canadian state. In consequence, political choices are now being
argued by most commentators only in the rhetoric authorized by the
Charter.
Nevertheless, some analyses are responsive to the Supreme Court's
position, and reflect the rudiments of a post-Charter theory of Canadian constitutionalism. Three propositions capture this theory's major
tenets. First, the juxtaposition of the Supremacy of God and the Rule
of Law in the preamble to the Charter arguably invites jurists to
remember that a charter is only a small part of a constitution, and to
reflect upon the interdependence of individual and community, of self
and other.14 7 Second, while the scope of pure judicial adjudication, the
realm of private law, and the concept of commutative justice are
perfectly congruent, most legislative schemes and other non-private
law legal processes (including constitutional arrangements) are reflexions of the justice of distributions.14 8 Third, the view that a Supreme
Court can adjudicate rights by invoking a charter understood as an

146. For critical commentary, see Mandel, The Rule of Law and the Legalisationof Politics
in Canada, 13 INT L J. SOC. L. 273 (1985); Monahan, A Critics' Guide to the Charter, in
CHARTER LITIGATION, supra note 90, at 383408; Petter, The Politics of the Charter, 8 Sup.
CT. L. REV. 473 (1986).
147. See Polka, The Supremacy of God and the Rule of Law in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms: A Theologico-PoliticalAnalysis, 32 McGILL L.J. 853 (1987).

148. For a demonstration of the major premise of this proposition, see Weinrib, The Intelligibility of the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 59 (P. Monahan &
A. Hutchison eds. 1986); Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence, 2 J. L. & PHIL. 37

(1983).
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artifact of legal liberalism improperly subordinates the institutions and

processes of distributive justice to the institutions and processes of
commutative justice.149
These three themes tie directly into issues of procedural due process canvassed earlier, for they recall that a legal system comprises
a heritage of practices, understandings, and conventions defining its
various processes. They also indicate that procedural justice is a dependent variable whose specific content often must be dissociated from
the norms of adversarial adjudication. Finally, they bring to mind the
limited role of judicial adjudication in elaborating standards of procedural due process. It is to be anticipated that the Canadian procedural due process edifice will continue to be erected upon this foundation. 10

149.

See Macdonald, Jurisdiction,Illegality and Fault: An Unholy Trinity, 16 REVUE

GtNtRALE DE DROiT 69 (1984).

150. I attempted to argue for such a theory as sustaining common law due process review
even before enactment of the Charter. See Macdonald, supra note 102. To restate the argument
of that essay, as modified to account for due process under the Charter, I claim that procedural
due process theory in Canada presupposes the following
A. Procedural due process is a concept that is applicable to a broad range of social interactions
and that does not require either- (i)
a formal state whose processes are to be reviewed, or
(ii) a regime of specific due process standards, or (iii) a third party authority to apply these
due process standards.
B. Procedural due process, even as a constitutional principle within a state, does not require
either (i) written standards, or (ii) a supremacy clause by which these standards override
legislative enactments, or (iii) judicial enforcement of these standards.
C. Procedural due process, even as a written, constitutionally supreme, norm enforced by
courts, does not require: (i) a liberal view of the relationship of citizen and state, or (ii) a 'theory
of natural rights" view of freedom, or (iii)
a commitment to adversarial adjudication as the
paradigm of what process is due.
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